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THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT AND
THE COUNSEL FEES RULE: PROCEDURE
OR SUBSTANCE AND REMEDY?
Joseph M. Lynch*
PART II: THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH-ANOMY
Paragraph (b)-"fund in court": The Trust Fund Cases
In the year prior to Sunset, the court had before it a rather simple
case, involving the preservation of a fund for a class of corporate
stockholders. An allowance of a counsel fee had been theretofore
authorized in this situation in Cintas as out of a "fund in court," and
had been affirmed under this provision of the Rule in Farber.This we
have heretofore termed the "trust fund" case. 207
In Leeds & Lippincott Co. v. Nevius, 20 8 the Weintraub court af-

firmed this line of cases with little discussion. There the corporate
plaintiff had sought and obtained a judgment declaring the respective
rights of its preferred and common stockholders, in relation to each
other and to the corporation, with respect to the distribution of the
net profits and surplus of the corporation. Certain defendants named
in the complaint had been made representatives of the separate classes
of stockholders and were allowed counsel fees to be paid from the
"undistributed net profits of the plaintiff's corporation." On appeal,
the corporation had argued this was impermissible since the proceeding
had been a simple one for declaratory judgment and hence no moneys
had in fact been deposited in court.
The court held that since the suit concerned the proper division
of the corporate assets, the assets were "in legal contemplation" brought
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207 For a full discussion of this line of cases, see material beginning at note
97 supra and accompanying text.
208 30 N.J. 281, 153 A.2d 45 (1959).
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within the control of the court. It might have been noted that in Cintas
itself, the court had said:
It is not necessary that the fund be actually and physically in the
possession of the court, or in the hands of the clerk of the court, or
a receiver, or a trustee. It is sufficient if, as a result20of
the litigation,
the fund is brought under the control of the court. 9
The important consideration in Leeds, the court emphasized, was not
the physical location of the assets, but that the defendants' efforts had
redounded not only to their own benefit, but to the benefit of all
members of their respective classes.
The case which followed, Sarner v. Sarner,210 was not, as was
Leeds or Cintas, a stockholders' class action, but rather a stockholders'
derivative suit brought on behalf of their corporations. Should the
Cintas rule concerning the creation or preservation of a common fund
be applied in this situation?
By this time Sunset had been written. And there had been dictum
in that opinion stating that in a stockholders' derivative action a "fund
in court" is created if the stockholders' efforts prove successful:
Where the litigant creates a fund which will benefit others,
again it is just that the fund be charged. Included are actions by
a stockholder on behalf of the corporation to recover assets diverted
or withheld from it.211

The issue in Sarner was whether the dictum in Sunset should apply to litigation involving a close corporation. In Sarner, two plaintiffs,
each owning 10 percent of the stock in three corporations, brought a
stockholders' derivative action for the vindication of the rights of the
three corporations. They joined as defendants the corporations and
their brother, the owner of the remaining 80 percent of the stock in
each of the corporations. They also sued on certain personal claims,
involving the partnership affairs of the three brothers. Plaintiffs were
successful, and an award was made in favor of the three corporations
as against their brother for approximately $484,000 and the plaintiffs
were allowed counsel fees. The supreme court affirmed the allowances
but only as to services rendered on the derivative claims. It rejected
the argument that because the plaintiffs constituted two of the three
stockholders and the defendant brother the third and remaining stock133 N.J. Eq. 301, 304, 32 A.2d 90, 92 (Ch. 1943).
38 N.J. 463, 185 A.2d 851 (1962).
211 33 N.J. 162, 169, 162 A.2d 834, 837 (1960). See cases collected in Hornstein, The
Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLuM. L. REv. 784 (1939).
209
210
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holder, plaintiffs were actually suing for their own benefit and not
advancing the interests of any other:
The court's judgment sustained plaintiffs' actions, and it follows
that the corporations should have brought the action and would
have paid counsel fees to their attorneys had they done so. By
not having brought the action, they in effect compelled plaintiffs
to do so, and it is only equitable that plaintiffs be reimbursed for
expenses including counsel fees ....

Since the results benefited the

corporations, their creditors and all stockholders as such, the burden of the litigation should be paid out of the treasuries of the
three corporations which profited. 212
There seems to be a mingling of the equities in Sarner. The
corporate refusal to bring the action may have compelled the plaintiffs
to sue, but so had the refusal of Belk to perform his contract with
Sunset Beach; and so had the refusal of Liberty Title to account to
Mrs. Plews. 213 The burden of suing in order to recover the benefit of
one's assets had not theretofore been considered a sufficient equity.
And while it is true that the Sarner plaintiffs had sued for the corporations as a matter of form, they were compelled by law, if suing
at all, to sue in this form, and it is not at all certain that anyone else
really benefited from their suit. Creditors were mentioned, but there
was no indication in the opinion that the corporations were in any
danger of insolvency. Stockholders were also mentioned, but the reality
is that the only remaining stockholder was the defendant Sarner who
can hardly be said to have benefited from the suit: the extent of his
gain as holder of stock was less than the extent of his loss as individual
defendant.
Therefore, it was not quite enough to rely in this context upon
the Cintas formula or upon the dictum in Sunset, as the court did.
Something further was required. Thus it might have been said that
defendant Sarner paid the counsel fee not as adversary (if that were
the case, he would have paid the fee in full), but rather as a benefited
stockholder in proportion to the amount of his holdings. The value
of his stock had appreciated by the return of the fund to the corporation. If this seems too fine a distinction, it could have been said,
as it was in an earlier appeal in the same case dealing with the merits
of the corporate claims:
212 38 N.J. at 469, 185 A.2d at 854-55 (citation omitted).
213 Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950) (discussed at
length beginning at note 41 supra and accompanying text).
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[T]he doctrine of disregard of the corporate form where necessary
for the accomplishment of justice and defeat of fraud is entirely
inappropriately invoked in this factual and procedural setting. 214
Thus, the Cintas rule, having constructed an allowance out of equitable considerations, will not be modified or set aside in favor of a
party who does not deserve it.
Yet with all these arguments, one does come away with the impression that the court has applied the trust fund rule to a case involving simple adversaries and that the overall equities in the plaintiff's
favor were not really any stronger than those of Sunset Beach and were
substantially weaker than those in favor of Mrs. Plews against Liberty
Title. The Sarners were successful not so much because of the merits
of their claim as because they were lucky enough to fall within the
shadow of the provision in the Rule regarding "fund in court," as
narrowed by the opinion in Sunset.
Of course this approach was inherent in the basic Rule. One did
not get a counsel fee simply because of the equities involved; Liberty
Title settled that. One received his fee only if he came within the
confines of one of the exceptions permitted in the Rule, such as "fund
in court." And that phrase did not mean that one could get a fee
where there were moneys in court which were the subject of litigation
simply because of the equities involved; Sunset should have settled that.
Thereafter, there could be a "fund" only where a party was not suing
merely for his own interests. This, the court had said, was the specific
equity recognized by that provision.
In Sunset itself it was obvious, insofar as Sunset and Belk were
concerned, that there was noncompliance with the Rule. In Sarner, it
was a close question, which the court resolved in favor of compliance.
Whether the specific equity recognized in Sunset was involved in Sarner was debatable, but that the allowance itself was in furtherance of
the overall equities involved in that case was clear. And in such a
case, the court properly construed the Rule to allow the claim to fall
within the specific equity covered by the Rule in order to do equity
generally. Nevertheless, it should have been apparent by then that the
court was not judging the proprieties of an allowance in terms of
equity generally, for that would be a return to the practice condemned
in Liberty Title-fashioning remedies to do equity.
Would it have made any difference in Sarner if the three brothers
had been engaged in their business pursuits, not in the form of the
close corporation, but rather in the form of a joint venture or partner214

Sarner v. Sarner, 62 N.J. Super. 41, 50, 162 A.2d 117, 122 (App. Div. 1960).
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ship? The answer is: yes. The case so holding was Grober v. Kahn. But
before discussing Grober and its relation to Sarner and Sunset, it would
be advisable to first consider the intervening "contract cases." Their
decision had a substantial impact upon the outcome in Grober.
Paragraph(c)-"In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage": The
Contract Cases
Decided in 1965, one year before Grober, the contract cases involved the court in a study of the applicability of R.R. 4:55-7(c) and
in a re-examination of that much-neglected precedent of the Vanderbilt
215
court, Bank of Commerce v. Markakos.
The lower courts, in a series of cases, surprisingly had not considered themselves bound by Bank of Commerce, but instead had
confined it to its actual holding. This had, of course, created an "exceptional" class of suitors: moneylenders who, by providing in their
loan transactions a provision for the inclusion in the judgment of
collection an allowance for counsel fees, would be permitted to skirt
216
the Rule in silence.
Such a departure from the stated authority of a supreme court
case would never, in all probability, have occurred in the days of the
Vanderbilt court without the approval of the Chief Justice (communicated, of course, along the judicial grapevine). Obviously this irregularity would have to be corrected. The task unhappily fell to the
Weintraub court; the time was at hand.
The first of the contract cases, Alcoa Edgewater No. 1 Federal
Credit Union v. Carroll,21 7 involved a demand, in a suit on a note for
principal and interest due of $630, for an attorney's fee of $126.
This demand was based on a provision in the note for payment of
collection costs and an attorney's fee "in an amount equal to twenty
percent (20%) of the principal and interest" due. The trial court,
relying on Bank of Commerce, held the provision invalid; but on
appeal, the supreme court reversed.
The court observed that most of the courts throughout the country
have taken the position that provisions in promissory notes for the
payment of attorney's fees for services actually rendered in collection
are not against public policy so long as the amounts are reasonable;
that their allowance may well spur debtors to make payments before
215 22 N.J. 428, 126 A.2d 346 (1956) (discussed at length beginning at note 141 supra
and accompanying text).
216 The "moneylender" cases are discussed beginning at note 152 supra and accompanying text.
217 44 N.J. 442, 210 A.2d 68 (1965).
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litigation, thereby, presumably, tending to avert litigation; and that
usury might be avoided by refusing their enforcement when such oppression appeared.
It stated further that the pre-1948 practice in New Jersey had not
led to abuse in this regard, and that the rule regarding counsel fees
had been adopted in that year to check the then existing abuses in
the equity practice. (The point of this distinction is too obscure in
view of the fact that the rule as written applies to law as well as to
equity, and that the distinction between law and equity had been
eliminated under the 1947 constitution.) Finally, the court took note
of the existing line of cases to which we have just referred, wherein
Bank of Commerce had been confined to its actual holding. In sum, it
concluded:
We are satisfied that R.R. 4:55-7 was not intended to and does
not preclude the enforcement of a contractual provision in a promissory note for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee for
services actually rendered in collection, and that [Bank of Commerce v.] Markakos has properly been confined to its actual holding
that a judgment in a foreclosure proceeding may not include any
provision for legal fees beyond those specified in the rule. We
reject the defendant's contention that such a provision may not be
enforced, absent express authorization by rule or statute. Without
any governing rule or statute, the provision is enforceable under
common law principles as a deliberate bargain between private
parties unless there is some larger public policy which is found by
the court to render it nugatory. We find no such policy in our
State. 218
The court referred without comment to statutory authorizations
for attorney's fees in certain types of contracts, and declared that the
instant contractual provision operated as an indemnity rather than
as a penalty and appeared neither usurious nor oppressive. It held that
the fee should be limited to the reasonable value of the attorney's
services, but that the sum of $126 was reasonable.
Thus the court gave its official, written approval to the line of
lower court decisions which, presumably on the basis of a prior unofficial and oral assent, had confined Bank of Commerce to its actual
holding. But this exercise at once involved the court in the thickest of
conceptual entanglements, as will appear from the second of the three
contract cases.
In the second case, Bergen Builders, Inc. v. Horizon Developers,
Inc.,219 plaintiff sued on a note secured by a land mortgage for princi218
219

Id. at 448, 210 A.2d at 72.
44 N.J. 435, 210 A.2d 65 (1965).
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pal and interest plus an attorney's fee in the sum of $5,520, in accordance with a provision in the note for collection costs "including
an attorney's fee of 15 percent." Despite defendant's argument at the
trial that the sum of $5,520 for attorney's fees would be unreasonable,
the trial court entered judgment in that amount. This was the only
issue raised below.
Unlike the plaintiff in Alcoa, Bergen Builders had two alternate
remedies available: suit on the note or foreclosure of the land mortgage. Also, unlike the case of a bond secured by mortgage (such as
Bank of Commerce), there was no requirement, statutory or otherwise,
that the foreclosure remedy be first pursued. Bergen Builders was free
to choose its remedy, but if it chose foreclosure, the judgment could
not have included a provision for legal fees beyond those set forth in
the Rule as interpreted in Bank of Commerce. Not surprisingly, it
chose instead its remedy on the note.
Of course, the wisdom of a rule so easily evaded was imputed.
The court moved to block the evasion and, on appeal, did so under
the cover of the only issue before it: the reasonableness of the allowance
made. Referring to the plaintiff's decision to sue on the note rather
than in foreclosure, it declared:
Nevertheless it would appear just that it receive consideration on
the issue of reasonableness where the plaintiff's note is secured by a
mortgage and foreclosure could readily have been pursued. Assuming, as has been represented by the defendants, that the mortgage
security was at all times wholly adequate and that the plaintiff
could have been fully satisfied in foreclosure, inquiry should be
made by the trial court as to why that course was not chosen and
whether it would now be equitable to burden the defendants with
legal fees beyond those which would have been included in a foreclosure proceeding judgment. Furthermore . . . the trial court

should clearly not have passed on the issue without first receiving
proof as to the extent of the legal services rendered and to be
rendered and the reasonable value thereof.2 20
Cohen v. FairLawn Dairies, Inc., 21 the third and last of the contract cases, involved an agreement made between certain homeowners
and commercial developers. The parties had agreed that if the homeowners should be successful in any suit for damages for breach of the
agreement, or to enforce it, or to enjoin the developers from a violation
thereof, they shall be entitled to recover, as damages in such suit, the
expense of reasonable counsel fees incurred in the commencement and
220

Id. at 438, 210 A.2d at 66.

221

44 N.J. 450, 210 A.2d 73 (1965).
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maintenance of that suit. Subsequently, the homeowners were successful
in obtaining an injunction against the developers on the basis of a
violation of that agreement. The supreme court held the contractual
provision for reasonable counsel fees enforceable. It held further that
a party seeking enforcement of such a provision "must ordinarily
establish the elements of his claim by plenary proof rather than by
affidavit." "Here, however," it added, "the proceeding before the trial
court dealt mainly with other substantive issues and only incidentally
with the matter of counsel fee .... ,,22
These then are the holdings of the contract cases. Obviously some
of the justices felt uncomfortable with the results. Justice Jacobs, who
had written the opinion in Alcoa, was moved, together with Justice
Schettino, to contribute a concurring opinion in Bergen Builders. In
it, they remarked:
It has been suggested that the distinction resulting from the
terms of the court rules between [Bank of Comnmerce v.] Markakos
... and this case is not a happy one and that the time is perhaps
ripe for comprehensive revision of R.R. 4:55-7. . . . When the

subject was last considered in the course of the original preparation
of our court rules, the broad English practice was deliberately
rejected in the light of our own Chancery history and because of
the fear that it may unjustly discourage the assertion of legitimate
claims. .

.

. Nonetheless the problem remains with us as a very

troublesome one and should receive further consideration not only
at a judicial conference but also at appropriate sessions of our
State and County Bar Associations. 223
As we shall see, this suggestion was picked up in short order with not
too happy a result. But first, we should consider the ramifications
of these decisions.
The effect of Bergen was the erection of formidable defenses in
the path of recovery of a land-secured noteholder on his claim for
attorney's fees. Its design presumably was to render such recovery as
ordinarily unmeritorious on the grounds of unreasonableness. The
noteholder would be in the same position as the bondholder, subject
to the provisions of the Rule and thus limited in his recovery to a flat
percentage. In practical effect the mortgagor would receive equal protection, whether the form of his debt transaction was bond or note.
But it is only the mortgagor who receives such protection. All other
debtors who have agreed to pay the costs of collection (Alcoa), as well
as any party agreeing to pay the costs of subsequent contractual litiga222
223

Id. at 452, 210 A.2d at 74 (emphasis added).
Bergen Builders,44 N.J. at 439, 210 A.2d at 67 (citations omitted).
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tion (Cohen), are beyond the protection of the Rule. The distinction
thus erected between land-mortgage debtors and contractors and all
other kinds of debtors and contractors is more than an unhappy one.
It is plainly unfair and smacks of unequal treatment.
The result in Bergen would be understandable and hence justifiable if there were some inherent reason for the inferior position
afforded the plaintiff in mortgage foreclosure. But Bank of Commerce
attempted no explanation, for did Bergen. The vice of Bergen is that,
confronted with the elemental arbitrariness of Bank of Commerce, it
chose neither to strike it nor limit it as in the cases of the moneylenders culminating in Alcoa, nor to refuse it further extension as in
the case of the simple contract in Cohen. Rather, it chose to stretch
its grip to reach the case before it.
In order to justify this dubious application of Commerce, the
court saw things backwards. It suggested that requiring Bergen to
pursue its remedy of a reasonable counsel fee like any other contractorcreditor was inequitable because not in keeping with the spirit of its
Rule. But it would seem more pertinent to judge the Rule in the
light of fundamental equity, rather than equity in the light of the
Rule. This is particularly true where, as here, the Rule fashions a
remedy in terms of a fixed and arbitrary rate. Indeed, the spirit of
the Rule, if it may be said to have one, is incompatible with the
court's own decision in Alcoa-that a contractual provision for counsel
fees at a fixed and arbitrary rate was enforceable only to the extent
of compensation for the reasonable value of services actually rendered.
Moreover, the results in Bergen and Alcoa have produced the anomaly
that in a suit on a debt, having its origin at law, the old equity practice
of confining recovery of counsel fees to their reasonable value has
been re-established; whereas in an action to foreclose a mortgage,
having its origin in equity, the same old equity practice has been suppressed in favor of the arbitrary rate of the Rule.
But this anomaly, and the peculiarity of Bergen are minor compared to the more basic inconsistency revealed in Alcoa and Cohen.
In Alcoa the provision for the payment of an attorney's fee was considered "enforceable under common law principles as a deliberate
bargain between private parties." It was further held: "The provision
operates not as a penalty but as indemnity to enable the lender to
receive his repayment in full .... "224 In Cohen, the court gave its
approval to the proposition that the enforcement of such a provision
"constitutes an adjudication of an element of damages for the breach
224

Alcoa, 44 N.J. at 448, 210 A.2d at 72.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:421

....
225 It also declared that "a party seeking enforcement of [such]
a contractual provision . . . must ordinarily establish the elements of
his claim by plenary proof .
*...26
But to speak in terms of contract and breach, of proof of the
elements of one's claim, is to speak in terms of substantive rights and
duties. And to speak in terms of enforcement, damages and indemnity,
is to speak in terms of the common law remedy of damages. Nowhere,
however, in Alcoa, Bergen or Cohen, d6es the court advert to the
terms substantive or remedial. In Cohen, it is true, the court did
briefly refer to the trial court's dealing "mainly with the other substantive issues and only incidentally with the matter of counsel fee
....
,22 But this was apparently an unconscious slip of the pen.
Otherwise, the topic was not mentioned. Otis and Commerce were
cited, but their holdings, that the allowance of counsel fees is a matter
of procedure and not of substance, were not mentioned. It was as
though Commerce did not exist except for its bare proposition that
the provision of R.R. 4:55-7 must be honored.
At this point, the fundamental inconsistency of the entire law of
counsel fees allowances was patent. If one contracted for such an allowance, the contract was enforced in the same manner as any other
substantive breach, except for the land mortgage situation. But if one
did not thus contract, if instead one was defrauded as in the case of
Mrs. Plews (or in the later case of Grober), or if one's debts were
secured by a land mortgage, such an allowance became a matter of
procedure, thus to be governed by the Rule.
By this time, it must have been totally clear: Otis and Bank of
Commerce were erroneous. R.R. 4:55-7 was conceived in error. Its
career of application was one long line of error. Only one question
remained: how error, thus systematically pursued, could be gracefully
corrected? Not by the initiative of the legislature. This path, we have
already noted, had been blocked by Winberry22 and Otis.229 And not
by the initiative of the trial court; this had been forbidden in Liberty
Title. The supreme court alone possessed the resource of creation.
Even here it would be difficult to be graceful. The Rule could be
amended to authorize once again the allowance of counsel fees by the
This view of Cohen appears in Alcoa, 44 N.J. at 448, 210 A.2d at 72.
Cohen, 44 N.J. at 452, 210 A.2d at 74.
227 Id. (emphasis added).
228 Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950)
(discussed at length beginning at note 33 supra and accompanying text).
229 State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1953) (discussed at length
notes 70-90 and 118-26 supra and accompanying text).
225

226
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trial court generally in matters of equity. But this would not eliminate,
the most obvious inconsistency. In actions at law there could still
be recovery for counsel fees pursuant to a provision contracted for in
advance.as ° The court would not have covered this inconsistency, which
seems to be based on the premise that an allowance on a contract is
beyond the reach of the Rule, thus seeming to suggest that the matter
in question is not procedural in essence after all. A return of the power
to the trial court to do equity would therefore not be thorough enough
and would serve instead only to suggest error. By admitting the failure
of Liberty Title, it would cast reflection upon the wisdom of Winberry.
Thus ultimately the entire rule-making power would be brought
into question. In view of that, the court might well hesitate to concede
mistake in the matter of counsel fees.
But any hesitancy on the part of the court to act was dispelled by
the next case, Grober v. Khan, involving the court once again in the
mysteries of "fund in court," the basic purposes of the Rule and fundamental problems of equity. The trial court, following Sunset, had
found no "fund." The appellate division, following Sarner, had. Grober would break the Rule into pieces.
Paragraph(b)-"fund in court" Continued: Grober v. Kahn-Portents
of Change
The supreme court had decided the contract cases in May of 1965.
Two weeks later, the appellate division heard oral argument in Grober
v. Kahn. It filed its decision on July 7th.2-l The following October
4th, the supreme court granted certification. Oral argument was set
down for January 25, 1966.
The facts were these. Grober was an officer in Condenser, a cor230 Later that same year, on Dec. 20, 1965, the supreme court, in Mastrobattista v.
Essex County Park Comm'n, 46 N.J. 138, 150, 215 A.2d 345, 351 (1965), created another exceptional inconsistency. It allowed the Civil Service Commission to include in its order
of reinstatement in a proceeding reviewing a Park Commission order of suspension and
discharge, an award of back pay subject to the requirement of mitigation of damages.
The court noted that it would be equitable that "consideration be given to the fees and
expenses necessarily incurred by the appellants in obtaining vindication." The court
cited Lowenstein v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 35 N.J. 94, 124, 171 A.2d 265, 281 (1961), for
support of this proposition.
Of course, in Mastrobattista the provisions of N.J.R.R. 4:55-7 were not directly
involved since it was not an action in the courts, but the holding is nevertheless contrary
to the declared purpose of the Rule. Indeed, its reasoning would appear applicable to
suits for back pay brought in the law courts, where Civil Service is not involved. The
effect of Mastrobattista,following hard upon the contract cases, must have had the effect
of further undermining the court's confidence in the soundness of the Rule.
281 88 N.J. Super. 343, 212 A.2d 384 (App. Div. 1965).
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poration controlled by Kahn. Condensor's attorney, who also represented Camden, another corporation, alerted Grober to an opportunity
for Condenser involving Camden. A deal followed: Condenser bought
certain property of Camden's and completed certain of its work in
progress; Kahn bought the remaining tangibles of Camden for $500,000.
Grober and Kahn executed a written agreement covering Kahn's
participation. After reciting that Kahn had borrowed $495,000 from
another corporation wholly owned by him, the agreement provided
that in consideration of $1,250 paid by Grober, $1,250 paid by Kahn's
wife and $675 paid by each of Kahn's two daughters, Kahn assigned
and transferred to Grober and to Mrs. Kahn 25 percent each, and to
each of his daughters 12V percent each, of his right, title and interest
in the Camden tangibles. It then called for Kahn to liquidate the
entire property and to distribute the net proceeds in accordance with
the stated percentages.
Grober filed suit against all the Kahns, seeking dissolution of
what he called a "joint venture," and an accounting and payment to
him of his percentage of the net proceeds. Kahn denied that the writing
by Grober was the true agreement and much of the ensuing trial
involved that controversy, but Grober prevailed on that issue. Grober
had also alleged that Mrs. Kahn and the daughters were fronts for
Kahn, but lost on that issue. The court then found Kahn chargeable
with net receipts and interest in the amount of $507,000, and held
Grober entitled to 25 percent of that sum minus a deduction for a
debt of his paid by Kahn. Out of that amount, Grober sought a counsel
fee of $100,000, an accountant's fee of $40,000 and an appraiser's fee.
The trial court denied any allowance. Following Sunset, it determined
there was no "fund in court":
The complaint sought to defeat the rights of Kahn's wife and two
daughters. Plaintiff unsuccessfully urged that they were "fronts"
for Herman Kahn, with no genuine interest in the joint venture.
[The court then noted that Mrs. Kahn and the two daughters
had joined in the defense with Kahn and presented a united 75
percent interest opposing Grober.] The services rendered by plaintiff's counsel were to advance the claims of his client and no one
else. There can be no clearer case of an adversary proceeding.282
An appeal was taken to the appellate division, which noted that
the trial court's order dissolving the joint venture was similar to the
statutory dissolution of a partnership; that, pursuant to such order, a
receiver had been appointed and placed in charge of the unsold realty
282 83 N.J. Super. 382, 387, 200 A.2d 130, 133 (Ch. 1964).
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and personal property acquired from Camden; and that the receiver
had sold this property for the sum of $435,000 and retained the net
proceeds subject to the control of the court. The appellate division
thereupon reversed the trial court, determining there was a "fund in
court." Relying on Sarner, it considered the proceeding in the nature
of a declaration of a trust fund for the joint venture rather than as
one seeking an accounting between partners, and found the trial court
had the power to award a counsel fee for the creation or increase of
the trust fund. It remanded with direction to the lower court to
determine whether in its discretion an allowance should be made. The
supreme court, reaffirming Sunset, reversed the appellate division and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court that, there being no "fund in
court," there was no basis for an allowance;233 two justices dissented.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Weintraub repeated what
he had said in Sunset when writing for a unanimous court-to qualify
under the provisional exception, "fund in court," the litigant must
do more than merely advance his own interests. Grober, it was held,
had only sued for himself; hence he must fail. Thus, whether the
action was for the declaration of a trust fund was not pertinent.
Sarner, the majority continued, was not to the contrary. There, an
allowance was made to the plaintiffs only for services rendered by
them on behalf of the corporation as stockholders; they were disallowed
any recovery for their claim made in their own behalf as partners in
partnership matters. Then, after a rather dubious review of the sup4
posed precedents against an allowance in partnership accountings,23
288 Grober v. Kahn, 47 N.J. 135, 219 A.2d 601 (1966).
284 The majority relied on Midler v. Heinowitz, 6 N.J. Super. 359, 71 A.2d 540
(App. Div. 1950), as an action for a partnership accounting wherein a counsel fee had
been denied as against the partner found guilty of fraudulent diversion of assets and
failure to account. 47 N.J. at 145, 219 A.2d at 607. But this would appear to be error.
As the appellate division opinion in Grober had pointed out, the issue raised on appeal
in Midler was not whether the partnership assets constituted a "fund in court" within
the Rule, but whether the Rule should apply at all to a suit begun in the former court
of chancery which, at that time, had general authority to grant an allowance. The
appellate division in Midler had cited John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, Inc., 3 N.J.
472, 70 A.2d 767 (1950) (discussed in detail beginning at note 18 supra and accompanying
text).
The majority further relied on other decisions which it said "proceeded on the
premise that an accounting action between partners did not involve a fund in court."
47 N.J. at 146, 219 A.2d at 607. They cited Long v. Mertz, 21 N.J. Super. 401, 91 A.2d 341
(App. Div. 1952) (discussed at notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text); Blut v. Katz,
36 N.J. Super. 185, 115 A.2d 119 (App. Div. 1955) (discussed at notes 136-38 supra and
accompanying text); and Schmerer v. Estate of Marcus Kirschenbaum, 39 N.J. Super. 475,
121 A.2d 414 (App. Div. 1956) (discussed at note 139 supra and accompanying text).
But, from our earlier discussion, it would appear that this is not a satisfactory state-
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the majority held that on the facts the parties' relation had not been
a partnership but a single-event arrangement.235 (It did not consider
whether, had the arrangement been a continuing one surviving the
case in controversy, the concept of the partnership entity might rightly
6
be employed, as the dissent argued, and an allowance thereby made.2
Had it done so, its position of disallowance might not have been so
sweeping.)
But Sarner was not the main ground of dispute among the justices.
The dissenters in the main, though not explicitly, were arguing for the
undoing of the position taken in Sunset. The concept of "fund in
court," they contended, should be broad enough to include cases of
fraudulent fiduciary behavior, at least where, as here, moneys were
actually in the custody of the court. The majority rejected this approach, though in direct terms it did not defend Sunset. Instead it
noted that the minority position would turn on the fortuitous presence
ment of their premises. Long turned in part on the factor of a consent judgment, in
part on questionable precedents, and in part on the more substantial analysis that the
successful plaintiff really sought a fee not out of the funds she had won, but in addition
thereto: "She wants a personal judgment against the defendants." 21 N.J. Super. at 404,
91 A.2d at 342. Blut followed Long, the court noted that plaintiff, the successful litigant,
sought a fee not out of the funds she had won, but out of the defendants' shares in the
partnership, and that she had rendered no benefit to the entire partnership estate. 36
N.J. Super. at 190, 115 A.2d at 122. In fact, the parenthetical phrase from Blut suggests a
premise in opposition to the majority's: moneys deposited with a receiver, not used because not needed to pay the victor's judgment, may constitute a "fund." Finally, Schmerer
was a case of an unsuccessful litigant suing merely on his own behalf.
235 47 N.J. at 147, 219 A.2d at 607.
236 The theory, based in some part on reality, would be that it was for the sake of
the business, the partnership as such, that the plaintiff sued. Of course, it will be said
that ultimately, regardless of the partnership which may indeed be bigger than both of
them, the plaintiff has sued to protect only his own interest in that going business; he is
serving only himself. But, such a view confuses the purely selfish interest of a person,
whereby he regards and uses all things for the advancement of his control and disposition, with the broader interests of a group or higher entity with which the person has
identified and for whose advancement he regards and uses all things. Although both such
interests reside in the very same person and can loosely be called "his own," they are
nevertheless separate and distinct. They operate in different matters and with different
effect. Indeed, strictly speaking, one cannot say that in serving the interests of a higher
entity, such as a partnership, that one is serving only himself. Cf. the discussion of Rousseau's concept of the "general will" in A.D. LINDSAY, THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE 230
et seq. (1947).
In any event, this same argument, that they were only advancing their own interests,could have been made against the brothers Sarner. And, as in Sarner, one might permit
the partner in such a situation a fee as out of a "fund in court" in order that in a close
case the equities might be better served thereby. Again, in order to do equity generally
in this particular case, the doubt will be resolved in the favor of the successful partner
as to whether he has complied with that certain equity contained in the "fund in court"
provision as specified in Sunset.
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of money in the court's custody.237 In addition, it said, the amount
of the allowance would bear no intrinsic relation to the fiduciary's
stake in the fund. The plaintiff would get the same allowance even if
the defendant owned 5 percent of the fund, and it might lead to an
allowance in the case of a merely negligent fiduciary. In sum, Grober
could not collect regardless of the other equitable factors involved.
To hold otherwise would be to change the Rule, as construed in Sunset.
And, declared the majority:
If a change is to be made, it should be made with directness and
in relevant terms. Meanwhile the policy of our rule should be
honored.238
The dissenters, seeking to find a "fund in court" in Grober, placed
reliance on the federal case of Tevander v. Ruysdael,23 9 where an allowance of counsel fees had been made to the successful party in an
action for a partnership accounting involving only two partners. It
was held that the judgment, by returning to the partnership assets
fraudulently diverted, had created a trust fund out of which it was
equitable to make the allowance. The court saw no reason for denial
in the fact that the members sharing the fund were two rather than
240
many.
The dissent's basic reliance, however, was placed on Katz v. Farber,24 ' where a "fund in court" had been found since money "actually
in the custody of the court (the purchase price of a contract) . . . [was]
the subject of the litigation . . . ." The opinion in Farber, it said,
must not be read as denying "equitable flexibility or individualization
... in the application of the rule.1242 Sunset had misread the holding
and meaning of Farber, thereby leading to an inflexible and inequitable application of the Rule.
To carry the dissent's argument further: Sunset had read the
words, "fund in court," in terms of group unjust enrichment. But not
only was there nothing in the precedents which required this inter237 Thus, the majority argued, it would not affect the decision in Liberty Title &
Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950) (discussed in detail beginning at note
41 supra and accompanying text). In that case, a defrauded widow was denied a fee as
against a fiduciary, no monies belonging to the fiduciary were in the custody of the court.
238 47 N.J. at 151, 219 A.2d at 610.
239 299 F. 746 (7th Cir. 1924).
240 This view overlooked the ordinarily non-adversary relationship of the others
sharing in the fund and the need, because of this relationship, to prevent unjust enrichment.
241 4 N.J. 333, 72 A.2d 862 (1950) (discussed at length beginning at note 97 supra
and accompanying text).
242 47 N.J. at 153, 219 A.2d at 611.
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pretation, and indeed some which opposed it,248 there was nothing in
the words themselves or in the Rule requiring the exclusion of all
other equitable considerations. True, there was the element of fortuity
involved: as the majority pointed out, plaintiff would get the same
allowance whether defendant owned 5 percent or 95 percent of the
fund. But it would appear that rough equity is better than no equity
at all. And the notion that one must be working for an interest other
than one's own did not square with the other provisions of the Rule.
Under paragraph (a), a woman in a matrimonial action is expected to
serve only her own interests. What qualifies her for an allowance is a
very different kind of equitable consideration, that of need. Then,
under paragraph (c), the moneylender receives a partial award while
in service of only its own interests. And under (d), the court had approved an allowance to a union for, again, simply advancing its own
interests.
Nor, as we have seen, is there any "legislative history" in aid of
construction. The best source of this kind is Farber,which Sunset had
quite drastically edited. The conclusion suggests itself: the majority
was not so much intent on honoring the language of the Rule as on
honoring its holding in Sunset. Sunset was meant to be exclusive and
the court would stand by its decision.
And here we have another anomaly. In Grober, the court, in its
judicial role, is standing by its own precedential construction of its
own rule in Sunset (despite the inadequacy of that construction and
despite the inequities it produced) until, in its legislative role, it
itself can find the time and solution to the overall problems of inconsistencies and inequities in the existing rule.
Grober was decided on May 2, 1966. Shortly thereafter, the court
was presented with the opportunity of amending the Rule, and thus
doing in its legislative capacity what in its judicial capacity it had just
refrained from doing: authorize the allowance of a counsel fee where
243 Thus, in Cintas v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 301, 32 A.2d 90 (Ch. 1943)
(discussed at notes 101-11 supra and accompanying text), the court deemed there to be a
"fund in court" in an action for the construction of a will or trust agreement since the
estate or trust is deemed to be "in court" and the subject matter of the litigation. See
note 111 supra. There was the suggestion in Blut v. Katz, 36 N.J. Super. 185, 115 A.2d
119 (App. Div. 1955) (see notes 136-38 supra and accompanying text), involving simple
adversary litigation, that had the monies on deposit with the court not been used to pay
off the plaintiff's judgment in accounting, they might have been available as a "fund" for
an allowance within the Rule. Finally, there were the words of Chief Justice Vanderbilt
in State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 12, 95 A.2d 715, 720 (1953):
It is well recognized that in an action such as this in the nature of an accounting the property is brought within the control of the court and constitutes a
"fund in court" within the meaning of [the counsel fee rule].
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conditions of equity require. But once again it declined to do so, and
decided upon a policy resulting in continued ambiguity and complication surrounding the subject of counsel fee allowances.
The Judicial Conference of 1966: Counsel Fees and Calendar Control
The first order of business at the annual Judicial Conference of
1966, held on June 16 and 17, was the submission and consequent
discussion of a State Bar Association committee report on counsel fees.
This report had been proposed in response to the suggestion made in
the concurring opinion in Bergen Builders that the comprehensive
revision of R.R. 4:55-7 "receive further consideration not only at a
judicial conference but also at appropriate sessions of our State and
244
County Bar Associations.
This proposal had been repeated in an editorial published in
the November 11, 1965, issue of the New Jersey Law Journal.245 The
editorial offered some guidelines of its own. It questioned the declared
bases for the Rule: the abuse in chancery before 1948 and the fear
that such awards may unjustly discourage the assertion of legitimate
claims. In fact, it said, the Rule may discourage the assertion of small
claims and encourage the harassment of the larger claim. Again, the
Rule may encourage the assertion of the grudge suit and harm the
less-advantaged defendant. Thus, it fosters in any suit the assertion of
improper claims or defenses. A different allocation of costs and counsel
fees, the editorial concluded, would do much to relieve these injustices.
It noted with approval the English practice and the federal equity
practice, and recommended the trial court be given a highly flexible
power of award. In so doing, it implied that the danger of abuse in
the trial court was not a significant danger.
While the control of the calendar of cases was a factor in its
considerations, the main thrust of the editorial-as its tide, The High
Price of Justice implies-was that the Rule as presently cast had an
unwholesome impact on the cost of litigation, and that the rightful
expectation of the parties that their causes could be properly decided
at reasonable cost was frustrated by its terms.
Subsequently, the President of the State Bar Association, following
up the recommendations of the editorial, appointed a committee to
review the problem of counsel fee allowances and to report to the
Association at its annual meeting in May, 1966. Thus, while the supreme court was deliberating the scope of "fund in court" in its
244
245

See note 223 supra and accompanying text.
88 N.J.L.J. 728 (1965).
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determination of Grober v. Kahn, the bar committee was deliberating
on the proper scope of the entire Rule. Shortly before the decision was
announced, the committee filed its report.
In this report, the committee recommended the allowance of
counsel fees generally: in the discretion of the trial court, in equity
matters including mortgage and tax foreclosures (thus eliminating the
fixed rate schedules); in prerogative writ proceedings brought on an
unsound basis or to correct the arbitrary use of power by a municipal
body or officer; and in condemnation suits where the amount of the
award was substantially in excess of the condemnor's offer. In exercising its discretion, it recommended further, that the trial court consider the justice or injustice of the suit or defense, the substantiality
of the claims presented, the success of the various parties, hardship
imposed on any party, and unwarranted delays and improper tactical
procedures utilized. The Rule, it concluded, should not exclude an
allowance to a losing party in a proper case. 246 The State Bar Associa-

tion, at its meeting held on May 19, 1965, had voted its approval of
the recommendation as to chancery and condemnation matters, but
its disapproval of a power to allow fees in prerogative writ actions.
Nevertheless, the committee decided to submit the report to the Con247
ference in its original form.

The committee chairman, the late Louis B. Le Duc of the Camden
bar, stated during the course of his presentation that the report had
been submitted to the State Bar Association prior to the recent decision
in Grober. That case, he said, had so narrowed the scope of "fund in
court" as to render the committee's recommendations for a return to
the broad powers of chancery essential. "The result [in Grober] is an
indictment of our Rules for it means that a deserving plaintiff will have
to pay his counsel ....,,248 (Mr. Le Duc had acted as counsel for the
losing defendants in the Sunset case, and the presiding officer at the discussion of this report was Chief Justice Weintraub, the writer of the
unanimous opinion in Sunset and of the majority opinion in Grober.)
Upon the conclusion of Mr. Le Duc's remarks, the Chief Justice
opened the discussion:
246 89 N.J.L.J. 308 (1966). It also advocated more specific reforms, such as permitting
an allowance to counsel prosecuting a contempt action and to corporations in labor disputes; but this would follow in any case if the general power were restored to grant allowances in matters of equity.
247 ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE
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May we have comments from the floor. Who would like to
speak? This is quite an important topic and I do not want to be
the advocate on the other side although I wrote both opinions
249
which are here under attack.
At the outset, it should be observed, we have a case of significant
misunderstanding. The committee chairman had not characterized the
majority opinion in Grober or its reasoning as worthy of indictment. He
had said the result in Grober was an indictment of the rule it purported
to construe. Nor had he mentioned Sunset. Yet the Chief Justice had
heard these remarks as an attack upon both of them. But this, under
the circumstances, was impolitic. For the person now talking spoke not
in his capacity as justice of a court which had decided a case and interpreted a rule, but as chairman of the body which had made the Rule and
now was contemplating its amendment.
And in this we have proven again the wisdom of the usual
American constitutional rule, the separation of the powers of government, which keeps distinct the function to make laws and the function
to say what they mean. Not only does the combination of these powers
in one governmental unit tend, as in the case of the Vanderbilt Court,
to produce judicial constructions of its own legislative acts so as to hide
the problems and bury mistakes. It also tends, as in the instant case, to
produce a legislative defense of its judicial constructions so as to discourage suggestions for legislative change.
Having made this point, let us return to the Chief Justice, who
immediately after the remarks previously quoted, said:
Many of you are old enough, as I am, to remember the background
of this problem of counsel fees. Historically they were granted, of
course, in the Court of Chancery and it developed into a full scale
scandal. We developed a series of fair haired boys who did very
well, and litigants had the worry of whether they could risk going
into Chancery or defending there.
I can recall as a young lawyer discussing with a New York
lawyer whether he could safely bring his suit in Equity in New
Jersey State Courts or whether he would be better off in Federal
Court where there could not be a counsel fee. Now, that is the
background out of which emerged the decision of 1948 to abolish
counsel fees except in limited categories. Frankly, I cannot for a
moment abide the kind of piecemeal approach that this report
presents. I see no difference between Law and Equity, Chancery
and the Law Courts. If we are to make sense [sic] to allow counsel
fees in Chancery, it makes as much sense to allow it [sic] in Law.
A prerogative writ is no different from any other in my book. If
249 Id.

at 4.
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anyone thinks that there's a difference, I would like to hear some
discussion on this. Nor does it make any difference to me if perchance the receiver is appointed in one case and not another. A
receiver is appointed for a wholly different reason.
The Bell [Belk] case was apparently for a suit for performance
but it happened that some of the money went into the court on
deposit and not only do the prevailing parties seek to get part of
that as counsel fees, but if my recollection is correct, counsel for
the losing party thought he could submit, too, because money or
something had not been deposited. To me those distinctions make
no sense and if anyone here can enlighten me as to why this is
meaningful, I would like to hear it.
I realize I may have a very deep bias, having written the opinions that I referred to. Now, I think that when we deal with this
problem, you have several lines you can draw. You can draw the
line that the prevailing party, of course, will be paid. Law or
Equity, you can draw another line. You can say that the party who
either sues in bad faith or defends in bad faith shall pay. You may
want to use some other approach. Hovering above all of that is
the problem of, as I say, the fair haired boy. Are we so matured
today and so cleansed of motivation that we can assume that we
will not be influenced by identification with individual lawyers in
making that kind of a decision? How far will we frighten litigants?
In England and Canada, as I understand it, you have counsel
fees and the impact upon the calendar is tremendous. We could
clear up our calendar problem if we adopted that rule I assure you.
The question is whether it is worthwhile to say to the litigant
whose case may be debatable, "If you want to bring it and lose,
you may,-as in some famous case in England involving a man
who sued for libel and lost-spend the rest of your life paying what
is due counsel for the prevailing party."
I think these are rather important issues and I would hope
that this topic would not be just lost in the sun. You must have
feelings. I would like to hear you or the Committee on the suggestions of the propositions I have put before you as to what line can
be drawn sensibly and why.
Have I moved anyone to speak?2 0
The message was clear: the report was dead. Nevertheless, one of
the committee members whose report was under this severe counterattack was moved to speak. He did not consider the allusion to the pre1948 practice apposite. There was greater control over the trial judges
today. And in a rather graphic allusion to the assignment power of the
Chief Justice himself, he declared that if there be a judge today taking
care of his "fair haired boys," he "might find himself trying intersection
250 Id. at 4-5.

COUNSEL FEES

1973]

canoe accidents in Samoa County on the simple order of the Chief
Justice." Further, he argued, the change advocated by the report would
2 51
help clear the calendar.
But, countered the Chief Justice, why a distinction between law
and equity? Suppose Grober had been at law? This was a good question, not directly answered. Instead, the committee member replied
that in negligence cases at law, juries consider the factor of a contingency fee and "lump it in with pain and suffering in the verdict."
But, the Chief Justice countered again, how does the jury take care
of the plaintiff who sues in bad faith? There is no counsel fee for the
defendant there. And he added:
As a matter of fact, we are talking about calendar control. It is the
negligence case that has our calendar in a clutter and it is there
that counsel fees would be a significant factor in calendar con252
trol.

Thus, in this initial colloquy, the Chief Justice expanded the discussion to include the possibility of counsel fees in all cases, including
that of negligence. In so doing, he shifted the attention from the recommendations of the state bar committee that had been the subject
of months of deliberation in favor of a far more radical and unexpected
proposition for which the assembly was totally unprepared.
The committee had shied away from recommending allowances
generally in actions at law, probably because of the negligence action.
While it may be true that it "is the negligence case that has our
calendar in a clutter," it is of greater significance that the economic
base for that type of action is markedly different from that of most
other litigation. The personal injury plaintiff is supported by the contingency fee arrangement and the ordinary defendant by his insurance
carrier.
The committee had included actions in lieu of prerogative writ as
deserving of allowance of counsel fee probably because, though at law,
they were tried by a judge, not a jury. Thus, it might have been
thought that this would not stir up anxiety in the breast of nervous
personal injury plaintiffs and defense attorneys. If this was its motive,
it pleased neither the bar nor the Chief Justice. The State Bar Association rejected the proposal regarding prerogative writ, presumably because for them it was too much "law." The Chief Justice rejected it
because for him it was not enough "law."
Certainly the criticism of the Chief Justice in this respect was
251
252

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
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valid. For instance, a litigant with a claim for breach of contract should
not be allowed or denied counsel fees depending on whether the
remedy sought is equitable or legal. Nor should it depend on whether
the factual issues are determined by a judge or a jury. Even under existing law, some legal claims triable before jury may involve the allowance
of reasonable counsel fees, as in a suit upon a contract or note including
a provision for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of the main claim (Alcoa, Cohen) or in a suit for malicious prosecution (Mayflower).
But if the recommendations in the report were too narrow, the
counterproposals of the Chief Justice were too broad. Consideration of
the negligence case could only swamp the discussion. The personal
injury bar would be alarmed and aroused against any change. And in
the rush to protect position and to defend the report, it would be
easily forgotten that the economic bases of the ordinary litigation and
the ordinary negligence case are significantly different.
In fact, several persons then present did address themselves to the
propriety of an allowance in a negligence case (although one lawyer
considered this out of order as not included in the report under discussion). Others spoke to the soundness of the report as submitted. Still
others spoke against it. Several worried about the test of "bad faith," its
meaning and applicability, the inhibiting effect it might have on the
institution of novel claims and thus upon "the expansion and modernization of our law." The Chief Justice remarked that the determination
of the issue of reasonableness in suing or defending might extend the
time of trial, and thus in the end, hamper rather than help calendar
control. .3 This seemed to contradict his earlier concern that the adoption of the English and Canadian approach to allowances would have
a tremendous impact upon the calendar. This impact should more than
compensate for the time later lost in collateral hearings. No one
pointed this out and this inconsistency was lost with all the others.
Eventually the discussion petered out in an air of inconclusiveness.
The report had been submitted, "discussed," and apparently that was
it. It is not too much to say that the report died on the floor that day,
to be heard from no more.
The lesson to be learned from this has nothing to do with the law
of counsel fees. Rather it concerns the methods by which rules of
procedure are modified. Theoretically, it was possible for the court to
have accepted the Le Duc report, admitted its strength, pointed out
its deficiencies, and by correcting them, build upon them. But psy253

Id. at 7-23.
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chologically it was impossible. The majority of the court had not asked
for it. They entertained it as an unwilling host. And there is evidence
that the entire court listened with only half an ear, its collective mind
already bent on a totally different solution. Off stage the court had a
new creation: a change in an already existing rule which would, it was
hoped, bring about the solution of both the counsel fee jumble and the
now increasingly pressing problem of the litigation explosion and trial
delay. Of course, the court would consider that its plan was within its
rule-making power.
THE

NEW

CREATION: THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT AND

THE LIABILITY

OF NONACCEPTANCE

The Problem of the Calendar
The report of the State Bar Association committee recommending
the amendment to the rule on counsel fees had been discussed and, in
effect, rejected at the morning session of the opening day of the 1966
Judicial Conference. At the afternoon session held the following day,
Justice Francis, on behalf of the supreme court, presented a proposal
for discussion. The proposal was an amendment to the existing rule on
offer of judgment whereunder, in certain circumstances, the offeror
would be entitled to an award of a reasonable counsel fee. Basically, it
provided that
at any time or more than ten days before the trial begins any
party . . . may serve upon any adversary... an offer of settlement
of the action for a sum stated therein .... If the offer is not ac-

cepted within two days prior to the trial, it shall be deemed withdrawn ....
If the offer . . .is not accepted and the offeror obtains a

verdict in the amount at least equal to his offer, he shall be allowed
in addition to cost[s] of suit, interest from the date of the offer.
...[I]n addition, [the plaintiff-offeror] shall be allowed a reasonable counsel fee when the verdict is 20% or more in excess of his
offer ....If the verdict is [at least] 20% ...

less than the amount

of the offer [of the defendant-offeror, he] shall be allowed a reasonable counsel fee ....254
The proposal, the Justice said, was one of many means of "persuading both plaintiffs and defendants to get together at an earlier time
and dispose of cases."1255 Indeed, that entire Judicial Conference had
254 ANNUAL
1966).
255 Id.

at 6.
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been organized around the theme of "calendar congestion." Some
fifteen proposals for speeding the trial of causes were suggested, and the
Chief Justice had himself related the subject of counsel fee allowances
to that of calendar congestion.
Of course, the problem of calendar control is always with us, but
in the fall of the preceding year there were statistical proofs that the
problem was on the verge of becoming critical. In the matter of cases
pending, there were four areas of particular concern: the calendar of
the appellate division, the combined civil calendars of the superior and
county courts, the criminal calendar of the county courts, and the civil
calendar of the county district courts. As of late, the appellate division
had been falling behind at the rate of about 20 cases per month. 256 Nor
from an inspection of the trial lists was the rate of regression likely to
slow. The combined civil calendar list had shown a rather rapid
growth, 257 due in large part to a prior growth in the civil calendar of
the county district courts 258 and to the necessity of committing more
judicial man-hours to the disposition of criminal matters. 259 With the
256 In the appellate division, cases had been added and disposed of in the following
numbers: 1961-62, 1039, 1054; 1962-63, 1061, 947; 1963-64, 1166, 1000; and for 1964-65,
1121, 921. In the then current year, 1965-66, 1263 cases would be added, about 200 more
than the cases disposed of in the most "productive" year, 1961-62. ADMINISRA
E OFFICE
OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIvE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS at iv
(1961-62), at v (1962-63), at v (1963-64), at iv (1964-65), at - (1965-66) [series hereinafter
cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
257 During the same period, the number of cases added and disposed of on the
combined civil lists of the superior and county courts were as follows: 1961-62, 24,145,
23,056; 1962-63, 25,230, 23,315; 1963-64, 27,825, 22,768; and 1964-65, 30,035, 28,439. In
1965-66, 21,101 cases were added. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 256, at iv (1961-62), at v
(1962-63), at v (1963-64), at iv (1964-65), at - (1965-66).
258 Formerly, cases started in the superior court or the county court were, pursuant
to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-47.1 (Supp. 1972-73), sent down for trial to the county district
court where it appeared with reasonable probability at pretrial conference that the
ultimate recovery would not exceed the jurisdictional limits of that court. For a discussion of the utilization of the statute, see ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 256, at 7-9 (1964-65).
But in the judicial year 1965-66, the program ran into difficulty. Litigants in the district
court, in a case transferred down, tended not to settle as readily as if they had remained
in the upper courts, and preferred to try their cases before juries which would be instructed that they were not bound by the ordinary jurisdictional limits of the district
court when awarding damages. Shortly thereafter, the calendar of the district courts was
clogged. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 256, at 115 (1965-66). Eventually, the supreme court,
by rule, provided for discontinuance of such transfers unless all parties waived their right
to trial by jury and the right to obtain a verdict greater than the jurisdictional limits of
the county court. N.J.R. 4:3-4(a). Quaere: whether such provisions constitute matters of
practice and procedure or pertain to administration of the courts?
259 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 256, at 59, 62 (1965-66). See the dissenting opinion of
Justice Francis in State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 156, 259 A.2d 895, 910 (1969) (discussing the
state of the criminal calendar).
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coming of the public defender in criminal matters and the legal aid
attorney in civil matters, it was likely that the number of cases tried
instead of pleaded and defaulted would increase substantially, thus
further slowing the rate of disposition both in the criminal and civil
trial courts. Further, the number of cases added in the civil trial courts
and in the appellate courts would increase substantially due to the
efforts of these new groups.
The most obvious solution was more judges. But 1965 was a
gubernatorial election year in New Jersey and the custom had developed in the state that in such a year the nomination of fewer, not
more, new judges are confirmed than usual. More striking measures
were taken to dramatize the judicial condition. The appellate division
was directed to discontinue the filing of written opinions except in
extraordinary cases. 260 Lawyers were adjured by a supreme court Justice
to learn to settle cases sooner, lest the automobile suit in the law court
be on its way "to its appointment in Samarra." 261 Notice was given to
the bar that the supreme court was considering providing, by rule, for
interest on unliquidated damage claims, including personal injury
claims. 262 A special bar committee considering calendar congestion
offered the suggestion of a limited counsel fee as a meritorious technique in the discouragement of unnecessary trials. 263 Eventually this
89 N.J.L.J. 1 (1966).
Francis, It is Later Than You Think, 89 N.J.L.J. 33, 39 (1966).
262 89 N.J.L.J. 65 (1966). This proposal was closely questioned in two editorials in
subsequent issues of the NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL. It was argued that such a technique
had proved unsuccessful in other states; that its availability might encourage plaintiffs to
stall
in settlement or use it as a bargaining tool; and that it was difficult to apply, and if
applied, insurance companies would pass on the costs in the form of higher premiums.
89 N.J.L.J. 212, 228 (1966). In addition, the editorials raised the basic issue: the "sanction
may not be legal." Specifically it was asked:
May such a rule fairly be characterized as "procedural"? Could the court impose
such a substantive burden on a litigant even by decision? Would not the authorized, and hence preferable, procedure be to have the Legislature enact an appropriate statute on the subject? Would the Legislature do it? If not, would the
merits and procedural advantages justify the Court rule, anyhow?
Id. at 228. This proposal was discussed during the 1966 Judicial Conference on "calendar
congestion." Justice Jacobs, presiding, acknowledged that the issue was controversial; that
past experience in other states suggested it did not expedite trials; and that there was a
substantive law principle involved. But as to the substantive principal, he said: "I don't
think that is our immediate concern. Our primary concern is whether this was [sic] a
device which would help expedite trials." ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 247,
at 4 (Afternoon Session, June 17, 1966). The proposal was eventually adopted, effective
Jan. 31, 1972. N.J.R. 4:42-11.
263 The committee had been specially constituted by the Trustees of the Institute
for Practicing Lawyers. 89 N.J.L.J. 17 (1966). The committee's suggestion appears at 89
N.J.L.J. 21 (1966).
260
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last suggestion formed the basis for the proposal offered by Justice
Francis at the 1966 Judicial Conference.
During the discussion, the Justice admitted to one defect: in the
event of a verdict for no cause, the lack of money available for the payment of defendant's counsel fees. Since, by his own experience (confirmed by a lawyer from the floor), about one-half of the cases tried
264
ended in just such verdicts, this seemed a substantial defect.
But the difficulty was more apparent than real. For though the rule
provided for a mandatory allowance of a counsel fee upon failure of
the verdict to come within 20 percent of the amount specified in the
offer, the actual sum to be allowed would be a "reasonable" one and
therefore within the sound discretion of the trial court. One of the
factors he should consider as bearing on the "reasonableness" of the
amount in a negligence action was, the Justice remarked, that: "Defense counsel is going to be paid anyway." Another was the plaintiff's
financial conditions: "what he does for a living and so on. '265 And it
could be surmised that a plaintiff who recovered a verdict for a million
dollars, as in a then recent Morris County personal injury action, could
266
expect to receive only a nominal counsel fee.
There were some comments from the floor that the rule was
wrongly premised. In cases of doubtful liability, where the odds are
50 percent or more against a jury's finding negligence, the settlement
value will often be at variance with the verdict eventually returned.
Thus, in such a case, where the damages could reasonably be calculated
at between $30,000 and $35,000, a proper settlement would be somewhere in between $10,000 and $15,000, even though the only proper
jury verdicts in the trial of the case would be either for no cause or for
a sum of between $30,000 and $35,000. It made no sense, some said, to
construct a rule designed to effect reasonable settlement amounts. The
settlement value, not the verdict, is the significant factor in determining the good faith in the negotiation of cases. Indeed, the rule, by focusing on the wrong factor, tends to inhibit compromise. But, in defense
of the rule, another argued that having negotiated in good faith, he
would not expect in that situation to have his clients socked with a
267
counsel fee.
Yet, if this is so, and if this is what the rule would amount to, then
what the court is moving toward is a return to (in any kind of case,
264 ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,

supra note 247, at 10-14 (Afternoon Session, June

17, 1966).
266

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 18-19.

267

Id. at 9-12, 14 (colloquy between Mr. McCord and Justice Francis).

265
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whether at law or in equity) the old equity practice of allowing counsel
fees in such amount as the trial court may, in its discretion, consider,
subject only to the interposition of one formal requirement: that the
party seeking the allowance must have made, in advance of trial, a
written offer of settlement. One participant protested that this would
lead to an increase in litigation: the number of motions made and
appeals taken.268 This suggestion was ignored. The premises leading to
the rejection of the State Bar Association report on counsel fees were
not to be noticed in a discussion of the supreme court's counterproposal
on counsel fees in the form of an existing rule on counsel fees. No one
raised the problem of the "fair-haired boys" and the corruptible trial
judges. Nor did anyone raise the question of the propriety of such a
proposal and the power of the court to make a rule governing the subject. No one uttered the words "not a matter of practice and procedure." In New Jersey, it is understood, this is practically useless.
In due time, the proposal, in somewhat altered terms, was given
formal publication in the Law Journal.The supreme court, a notice
269
to the bar said, is presently considering the adoption of a rule, etc.

Eventually, the proposal would become rule of law. And the law of
counsel fees in New Jersey would once again be drastically changed.
But before considering this drastic change and the events leading
up to it, let us finish the story on calendar control. Eventually, it was
the Governor and the legislature who came to the rescue. On May 31,
1966, legislation took effect raising the number of superior court judges
from 52 to 78.270 Most of the newly created judges were appointed and
serving by October, 1966.271 In the same year, the number of authorized
county court judges was increased from 71 to 79.272 In the following
year, the number of county court judges was again increased to 85 and
the number of district court judges was raised from 30 to 35.273
In December, 1966, the New Jersey Law Journalwas editorializing
on the shortage of trial lawyers. 274 This, it declared, was the crucial
factor in trial delay. The number of trial judges had increased so
rapidly that the bench was now ahead of the bar. Thus, rather quickly,
it retreated from the position it had taken earlier in the same year that
the addition of more judges was not the answer.
Id. at 17.
269 91 N.J.L.J. 1 (1968).
270 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:2-1 (Supp. 1972-73).
271 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 256, at 55 (1966-67).
272 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3-13 (Supp. 1972-73).
273 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-12.2 (Supp. 1972-73).
274 89 N.J.L.J. 772 (1966).
268
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The number of cases disposed of rose from 22,929 in the court
year beginning September, 1965, to 28,783 in the following year, and
to 33,992 in the very next year. Nevertheless, one cannot say that the
problem of the calendar was solved. During those same three years,
beginning with September, 1965, cases were added in the following
numbers: 31,576, 32,126, and 35,555.275 The addition of the newly

authorized judges had succeeded only in preventing the delay in reaching trial from getting worse.
For the supreme court, however, these two problems, calendar
control and counsel fees, were hereafter intertwined so that progress in
the solution of the latter depended on the perceptible aggravation of
the former.
The ContinuingProblem of Counsel Fees
Grober v. Kahn, with its construction of "fund in court," had been
decided in May, 1966. The Judicial Conference of 1966, with its rejection of the Le Duc report and with its discussions of the many proposals
for calendar control, had been held in June. Thereafter, for a time the
topic of counsel fees largely dropped out of sight and hearing.
A complete revision of the rules was submitted to the court by its
advisory committee in the fall of 1966. No change in the rule on
counsel fees had been made. Old R.R. 4:55-7 had its number changed,
but its provisions were still intact. Nor had any change been made in
the rule regarding an offer of settlement or provision made for the
award of interest as a sanction for non-settlement.
In December, 1966, the court did have to decide a case involving
counsel fees, but it did so in a most noncommital manner. In Gerhardt
v. Continental Insurance Cos., 27 6 a suit was brought for declaratory

judgment to determine whether the insurance company had been
required, under a comprehensive homeowner's policy, to defend its
insured in a workmen's compensation proceeding involving her domestic. The court held for the insured, and determined accordingly that
the company "must bear, as a traditional element of damage, the expense including the reasonable counsel fee incurred by the insured in
defending there in its stead."2 77 Once again, the court had used the
term "damage" as it had in Cohen. Nevertheless, it cited neither Cohen
nor Alcoa, though both cases, involving recovery of damages for counsel fees for breach of contract, as did Gerhardt,were highly relevant.
275 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 256, at viii (1965-66), at viii (1966-67), at xi (1967-68).
278 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966).
277 Id. at 800, 225 A.2d at 334.
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Plaintiff pushed the court one step too far. She also sought an allowance of counsel fees for the expense incurred in bringing the very
suit before the court, the declaratory judgment action. This the court
denied her on the basis of "R.R. 4:55-7 and the judicial precedents."
She had argued "fund in court." The court correctly held there was
"nothing to support this." She had argued inherent equitable powers
and out-of-state precedents. The court ignored her first argument and
replied to her second by noting that the precedents cited rested on
statutory provisions not present in New Jersey. It concluded its opinion
in a cloud of ambiguity:
When our court rules were originally adopted they embraced the
view that sound judicial administration will best be advanced by
having each litigant bear his own counsel fee except in those few
situations specially designated in R.R. 4:55-7.... There have been
calls for restudy of the counsel fee . .. [The Court then cited the

concurring opinion in Bergen Builders and the editorial position
of the New Jersey Law Journal.] and the subject was dealt with

fully at the June 1966 Judicial Conference. No modifying action
has thus far been taken and in the absence thereof the pre-existing
rules are to be deemed controlling.2 78
The phrase "sound judicial administration" is an ambiguous one. It
may refer to the need to take from wayward trial judges the temptation of favoring "fair haired boys." It may refer to the desire to avoid
protracted collateral hearings, or both. In any event, it has the undoubted advantage of clouding under cover of its broad comprehensive
sweep such troublesome categories as substance and procedure, remedies, the administration of justice and the administration of the courts.
In this one grand phrase, the necessity for distinctions disappears from
view.
Nevertheless, it is necessary once again to insist that despite the
phrase, we have in Gerhardt another unhappy distinction. A plaintiff
can recover counsel fees incurred in the workmen's compensation proceeding in a subsequent suit in the superior court under her contract
of insurance, presumably as a matter of remedy for a substantive right
and hence not covered by the Rules. But she cannot recover counsel
fees incurred in the declaratory judgment suit brought in the superior
court, presumably as a matter of procedure and not of remedy for a
substantive right, and hence covered by the Rule.
But by this time we are well beyond adequate explanation. In
Grober, the Weintraub Court had reached a judicial climax of rational
278 Id. at 301, 225 A.2d at 334.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:421

contention and dissenting dialectic. Now it had embarked upon another course--decision without explanation pending the time for
legislative action. Having rejected the good offices of the State Bar Association, it had decided to go it alone in the vacuum of its own creation. The court as the solitary party was attempting, without signposts
or danger signals, without outside collaboration, an experiment by the
crude method of trial and error. But that past error might not appear
too obvious, the path of error had to be slowly retraced at the same
time as the new path was being selected. The Rule would therefore
continue to stand, riddled by "exceptions," while the court developed
and revealed an alternate plan.
Red Devil: Counsel Fees, a Method of Calendar Control
Just over a year after the decision in Gerhardt, about eighteen
months after the conclusion of the 1966 Judicial Conference, the
supreme court took the first formal steps toward its resolution of the
problem of counsel fees. In the December 21, 1967, and January 4,
2 7 9 it gave notice to the bar
1968, issues of the New Jersey Law Journal,
that it had under consideration a proposed amendment to the rule
regarding an offer of settlement along the lines set forth by Mr. Justice
Francis at the 1966 Judicial Conference. The court was thus pronouncedly leaning toward the wedding of counsel fees with a litigant's
failure to settle. The moment had come when the court would reveal
its plan.
The fall of 1966 had not been such a time. With the creation of
new judgeships and the influx of the new judges, the state of the
calendar had ceased to worsen. Calendar control was, for the time, not
an issue. Thus it would have been inopportune had the proposed revision of the rules submitted to the court in November, 1966, contained
a provision, in the name of calendar control, for a radical change in
the sanctions following failure to accept an offer of settlement. Instead,
without any such radical change, the revision had been distributed to
the bar in March, 1967,280 and discussed at the 1967 Judicial Conference held on May 17, 1967 .281
90 N.J.L.J. 825 (1967); 91 N.J.L.J. 1 (1968).
90 N.J.LJ. 148 (1967).
281 ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 247 (Morning Session, May 17, 1967). In
the proposed revision discussed at the conference, former N.J.R.R. 4:55-7 on counsel fees
had become proposed N.J.R. 4:42-9 with no important change; and former N.J.R.R.
4:73 on offer of judgment had become proposed N.J.R. 4:58, again with no important
change. The proposal regarding the sanctions of interest and counsel fees had not been
added.
279

280
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Shortly thereafter, the climate of opinion changed. A new president of the New Jersey State Bar Association, in an incoming address
delivered to the Association in May, 1967, leveled an attack upon the
evil of, among other things, court congestion and pointed to the large
number of automobile-personal injury cases on the calendar as one of
its principal causes. 28 2 Not surprisingly, during his tenure as president,
prominent attention was given to a consideration of the merits of the
Keeton-O'Connell plan as a device for the elimination of the trial of
these automobile cases in the courts of the state.
In the fall of 1967, the New Jersey Law Journalpresented the case
for adoption of the plan in New Jersey. In its issue of September 14, it
editorialized in its favor. 28 3 On October 26, it ran a front page summary
of it.284 On December 7, O'Connell himself came to New Jersey and
debated the plan's merits at a mid-winter session of the State Bar Association. The following week the Law Journal set forth a lengthy
account of the debate and accompanied it with its editorial view of the
proceedings, including therein a commentary on the "unfriendly" attitudes of the trial bar in attendance. 285
It was in this climate that the next counsel fee case, Red Devil
Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co. was argued (October 23, 1967), considered
and finally decided (December 18, 1967).286 In a most unusual approach
to the Rule regarding counsel fees, the court thought it not applicable
rather than not controlling, and fashioned the remedy of counsel fees
in lieu of another but less satisfactory remedy because "the equities
would be better fulfilled and the administration of justice be better
served."
The facts are as follows. Red Devil manufactured and sold to
hardware wholesalers a line of painters' and glaziers' tools under its
trademark, "Red Devil." It did not make or sell paint brushes, but Tip
Top did. The latter commenced upon a course of using and applying
the trademark "Red Devil" to its brushes and selling them to wholesalers handling the general line of Red Devil's products; confusion resulted. Tip Top enjoyed considerable sales.
Red Devil brought suit in the chancery division which found that
Tip Top had wrongfully and deliberately appropriated the plaintiff's
mark and infringed upon it to sell more brushes and make a greater
282 90 N.J.L.J. 351 (1967). The officer was John J. Gibbons, now a Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
283 Id. at 604.
284 Id. at 697.
285 Id. at 809.

286 50 N.J. 563, 236 A.2d 861 (1967).
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profit than possible without the use of the "Red Devil" mark. The trial
court enjoined the continued use of the mark and ordered an accounting to the plaintiff of all profits realized on the sale of "Red Devil"
brushes since the beginning of the operation. The appellate division
affirmed the injunction, but vacated the order for accounting on the
ground that the injunction without any additional relief satisfied "the
equities of the case. '287 Both parties sought and obtained certification
to the supreme court.
That court, having disposed of certain jurisdictional points, rejected the argument that the remedy of injunction was improper and
turned to the remaining issue, whether plaintiff was also entitled to an
accounting for damages, not for harm done but for profits accruing
from the trademark appropriation and infringement. The court regarded the remedy of an accounting "time consuming and expensive
and its product [having] no relation at all to any loss or damage
actually suffered by the plaintiff. '28 It considered that defendant had
...

acted on advice of counsel, yet was not innocent but had deliberately
incurred a risk. It noted that in some federal cases injunctive relief
plus allowances for expenses of litigation, including reasonable counsel
fees, had been considered sufficient, and concluded as follows:
In view of the circumstances, we consider that the equities of the
case will be satisfied by the broad injunction entered at the trial,
plus an allowance to the plaintiff of all of its litigation expenses,
including a reasonable counsel fee to be fixed by the trial court on
the basis of the trial and appellate records and affidavits of services
in the trial and appellate courts.
This relief will furnish adequate protection to the plaintiff
for the future and take care of its actual damage to date, will cut
into any unjust enrichment of the defendants, and will tend to
serve the deterrent purposes ....

[I]t appears to us that the equities would be better
fulfilled and the administration of justice better served by substituting an award of litigation costs for an ill-suited and more
burdensome accounting. This course furnishes a fair measure of
compensation in lieu of rather than in addition to the plaintiff's
claimed right of recovery on its substantive cause of action, and,
viewed realistically, does not transgress on the safeguards contemplated by the court rules.28 9

The court, as we have said, regarded R.R. 4:55-7 as not barring
such relief, alluding to the provisions in the then R.R. 1:27A for the
92 N.J. Super. 570, 576, 224 A.2d 336, 340 (App. Div. 1966).
288 50 NJ. at 574-75, 236 A.2d at 868.
289 Id. at 575-76, 236 A.2d at 868-69.
287
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relaxation of any rule where strict adherence thereto would work a
manifest injustice.2 90 It cited Alcoa, Gerhardt and Mayflower and considered that while distinguishable "they evidence a willingness to hold
R.R. 4:55-7 inapplicable where its historical goal would not be defeated
2 91
or impaired."
Of course, this is just not so. The historical goal was to take from
the trial court its power to make the allowances for counsel fees, because some judges were not trustworthy. Certain exceptions had been
made in the Rule, although it had never been explained why the trial
bench was to be any more trustworthy in those instances than in others.
In the cases just cited, the court had considered the Rule not applicable
but had never given a satisfactory explanation for its decisions.
With this in mind, let us examine more closely the basis given for
the relaxation of the Rule in Red Devil. It was stated there that the
alternate remedy to the allowance for counsel fees, an accounting,
"would have no relation at all to any loss or damage actually suffered
by the plaintiff." But the plaintiff had not, of course, argued for loss of
business for a product it did not make. Its claim rather was that the
defendant's sale of paint brushes was in large part the fruit of an improper appropriation of its trademark, and that in consequence a large
part of the profits belonged to it. Plaintiff had pointed out that in the
year defendants first began its course of infringement (1962), their sales
had increased by about $790,000 or 54 percent over its prior year's sale,
and that defendants had never spent more than $6,000 in any one year
for advertising. The court, as if in answer, stated that an "accounting
would be time-consuming and expensive." But the plaintiff, having
sought an accounting, certainly had no objection to the time and expense involved, and defendants, having created the very situation which
necessitated the complicated accounting, were in no position to complain of its time consumption and expense. The trial court, far from
protesting, had in fact directed the accounting. Thus the concern in
29 2
this regard was that of the supreme court itself.
290 In the 1969 revision, former N.J.R.R. 1:27A became N.J.R. 1:1-2. The Tentative
Draft Comment noted that no change was intended.
291 50 N.J. at 576, 236 A.2d at 868. Alcoa is discussed at notes 217-18 supra, Gerhardt
at notes 276-78 supra, and Mayflower at notes 159-60 supra and accompanying texts.
292 In fact, plaintiff had strenuously argued for the accounting. It had conceded
in the appellate division that under the RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 747, at 648, 653 (1938).
upon which defendant had relied, an accounting would not be a proper remedy where,
as there, the parties were not in competition. But it asked that the court follow the
more recent allowance of such a remedy in a non-competition case, Monsanto Chem.
Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
942 (1966), as in the public interest to deter fraudulent sales practices.
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We will have to take the court's word that with its solution "the
equities will be better fulfilled." Perhaps it is true that had the Rule
controlled and allowances for expenses of litigation not been made,
the plaintiff would be no better off with an accounting. The total of
its expenses for the trial and appeal just completed, including counsel
fees, and the expense it would have incurred in a subsequent accounting might have been in excess of what it could have gotten out of the
accounting. (Yet we were told the defendants' business had increased
by some $790,000 and their costs in advertising hardly at all. In the
absence of some estimates of litigating expenses, past and to come, and
of the amount of profits involved and the part thereof attributable to
the plaintiff, it is impossible to begin to evaluate the court's position.)
If so, then it is probably also true that "the administration of justice
[would] be better served" by this ready and rough substitution of
remedies.
These two facts are interrelated: the monetary amount sought in
a remedy, and the time (and therefore the money) it takes to try a case
in order to give the remedy. This is why there are courts of inferior
jurisdiction with power to give only limited amounts in money judgments. The practice in these courts is simplified and tending toward
the summary.
The crucial factor in Red Devil then, one moving the court to set
aside the remedy of accounting, seems to be in large part the expedition
of the trial calendar and the husbanding thereby of the resources of the
trial judiciary. The other factor, the adequacy of the remedy (given
the amount of money sought), did not apparently receive the same
attention. This is understandable. In view of the concurrent excitement
over Keeton-O'Connell, considerations of calendar control obtruded.
This brings us to the matter with which we are consistently concerned:
that of counsel fees. For it would seem that this remedy was in the
main substituted in lieu of an accounting as a device in the service of
the cause for calendar control.
Counsel fees may be allowed if they will save the time of the court
below. From this, it would follow that ordinarily they are denied, in
Plaintiff further pointed out that where courts have adhered to the rule of the
Restatement, they have modified the harshness of the rule by liberally awarding an
actual and reasonable attorney's fee to the plaintiff as against the wrongdoing defendant.
But, it argued, since such an award might be improper by virtue of the provisions of
the Rule, this was all the more reason for affirming the accounting relief. See Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellee 24-27, 266 BRIEFS OF NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT, APPELLATE DIVIsIoN.
(It would appear that this suggestion of plaintiff's became the source for the holding
in the supreme court that an allowance for a counsel fee was proper in "view of the
circumstances" of the case.)
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part, because the decision for or against an allowance would tend to
occupy too much of the trial judge's time. Thus to save time and expense, to promote sound principles of "the administration of justice,"
the Rule generally forbids their consideration. Presumably, the few exceptions it does permit in some way fulfill the equities without unduly
affecting these principles.
It is true that one of the historic reasons given for the stringent
position of the American courts in the allowance of counsel fees generally is the undue demands a contrary rule would place upon the trial
bench. The then recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
Fleischmann v. Maier Brewing Co. (decided May, 1967) had called this
to mind:
Also, the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees
would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration. 293
And during the course of the discussion of the Le Duc report at
the 1966 Judicial Conference, the Chief Justice had raised the objection
to a suggested imposition of counsel fees upon a litigant suing or defending in bad faith that the practice would, if it involved a post-trial
inquiry, "lengthen our calendar problem." Nevertheless, it is fair to
say that prior to the Conference, the court had seldom, if ever, based its
support of the Rule upon the state of the calendar. And it is also fair
to say that seldom in recent years has the lengthening of the calendar
seemed, in other areas of the law, an important consideration in the
decision to recognize the validity of newly asserted claims. The number
of newly protected interests in the field of torts and contracts has grown
substantially over the past two decades. And with them, the number of
294
cases added to the calendar.

Besides, in the matter of allowances for counsel fees, there is one
important difference between the limitations generally imposed under
the American rule, as followed in the federal system, and the limitation
imposed upon the trial courts in the State of New Jersey. In America
generally, the courts, in declining to give the remedy and thereby declining to recognize the existence of a claim, operate in the realm of
the substantive and the remedial. As such, their decision not to allow
a counsel fee because of considerations, of calendar control among
others, is subject to later suppression by legislative enactment. Indeed,
in Fleischmann, the court refused the remedy of counsel fees because
293 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (discussed at notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text).
294 See remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the American Bar Association,

reported in 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 930 (1970).
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it deemed that the statute creating the claim had intended to limit the
recovery on such a claim so as to exclude the allowance of counsel
fees.2 9 5 In New Jersey, however, despite the intermittent recognition
that an allowance fulfills the equities of the case, and despite the
statement in Red Devil that the allowance therein was "in lieu of
rather than in addition to the plaintiff's claimed right of recovery on
its substantive cause of action," the court continues to refuse to recognize that it has subsumed the realms of the substantive and the
remedial under the procedural. As such, it refuses to recognize the
competency of the legislature to amend its decisions in the matter by
statutory enactment. In Red Devil, moreover, we have the suggestions
for a development of another approach: that the allowance of counsel
fees is part of the overall problem of calendar control, that calendar
control is part of the proper administration of justice, that the administration of justice and the administration of the courts are one, and that
since the court has the power to make rules regarding the administration of the courts, it has power to make rules regarding calendar
control and hence regarding counsel fees.
The merest glimmering of this had been hinted at during the
discussion at the 1966 Judicial Conference relating to Proposal No. 7
for the speeding of trial causes: the proposal for the allowance of
interest in personal injury and other unliquidated damages cases. The
moderator of the discussion, Mr. Justice Jacobs, had referred to the
remedy as a "device . . . to help expedite trials" and therefore, presumably, a proper matter for the rule-making power, albeit it involved
substantive law principles. 296 The same jurist was the author of the
opinion in Red Devil, wherein we have a further unfolding of the
doctrine. Counsel fees will continue to be regulated by rule, as part
of the administration of justice confused therein with the administration of the courts. The internal contradictions of this new approach
we will shortly explore when, full-blown, it assumes its shape in a
newly proposed rule.
In the meantime, there were clues to what the court was up to.
The rationale in Red Devil might have been cryptic, but for those who
had the time and acuity to crypto-analyze, the path of the law to
come was visible. Four days after the decision in Red Devil, while the
heat from the excitement generated by the debate on Keeton-O'Connell
was still warming the atmosphere, the court dropped a few more
clues. In the December 21, 1967, and January 4, 1968, issues of the
295
296

386 U.S. at 719-20.
See note 262 supra.
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New Jersey Law Journal,it gave formal notice to the bar that it had
under consideration a proposed amendment to the rule regarding offer
of judgment, involving, for failure to accept, the sanctions of the allowance of a reasonable counsel fee and of the imposition of interest
297
running from the date of the offer.
But for those of the bench and bar who were neither blessed with
time and acuity sufficient to read the future, nor privy to the secrets
of the judicial grapevine, the course of the court in the matter of
counsel fees would be an enigma. Looking to the court for guidance
as to the extent the rule regarding counsel fees could be relaxed,
they were to find little guidance. In fact, even when a case that falls
within the Rule did arise, the court seemed loath to talk.
After Red Devil: Reticence
Silverstein v. Shadow Lawn Savings & Loan Association, decided
one month after Red Devil, was such a case. There, the supreme court
reversed a summary judgment entered below on behalf of the defendant and directed in its stead the entry of summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. The court allowed the victorious plaintiff, as a class
representative pursuing a "spurious" class action, an award of counsel
298
fees as being "within the spirit of R.R. 4:55-7(b)."
Silverstein, a mortgagor, had sued for breach of contract, claiming
that it was improper for the defendant mortgagee to amortize the
mortgage on the basis of a 365/360 computation of interest in the
absence of a provision in the mortgage to that effect. His claim having
been upheld, a restatement of the principal amount due on his
mortgage and, on the basis of stare decisis, of the principal amounts
due on all other mortgages held by defendants and similarly treated,
was required. Thus, although not participants in the case, all other
mortgagors had been benefited. The sum of $5,000 was fixed by the
court as compensation for counsel services rendered at the trial and on
the appeal, to be paid at once by defendant and then deducted on a
pro rata basis from all its other mortgage accounts.
Although Cintas, a genuine class action case, was closest in point,
the court did not cite it. Nor did it mention Sunset, wherein the cases
in point had been marshalled, or Grober, following Sunset. Instead, it
cited Sarner, involving a stockholder's derivative action rather than
a class action, and R.R. 4:55-7(b), but without a reference to that provision's famous phrase: "fund in court." And while it mentioned Red
297 90 NJ.L.J. 825 (1967); 91 N.J.L.J. 1 (1968).
298 51 N.J. 30, 45, 237 A.2d 474, 482 (1968).
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Devil, as though in passing, it did not cite the federal precedent directly
in point, Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank.299 In Sprague, the United
States Supreme Court, in allowing a counsel fee to a plaintiff in a
spurious class suit, stated the basis for the allowance in these terms:
That the party in a situation like the present neither purported to sue for a class nor formally established by litigation a
fund available to the class, does not seem to be a differentiating
factor so far as it affects the source of the recognized power of
equity to grant reimbursements of the kind for which the petitioner in this case appealed to the chancellor's discretion. Plainly
the foundation for the historic practice of granting reimbursement
for the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable
costs is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do
equity in a particular situation. Whether one professes to sue

representatively or formally makes a fund available for others may,
of course, be a relevant circumstance in making the fund liable
for his costs in producing it. But when such a fund is for all practical purposes created for the benefit of others, the formalities of
the litigation-the absence of an avowed class suit or the creation
of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis rather than through a
decree-hardly touch the power of equity in doing justice as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation. As in much
else that pertains to equitable jurisdiction, individualization in
the exercise of a discretionary power will alone retain equity as
a living system and save it from sterility.300

The failure to cite Sprague and acknowledge the force of its rationale may be of some significance. The difference between the federal
system and the New Jersey system would persist: in the federal courts,
an allowance is authorized as a remedial device so that a court supposedly having equitable powers may do equity when equity ought to
be done; in New Jersey, it would continue to be authorized as a
matter of rule of practice and procedure.
Further, the failure of the court even to mention the phrase
"fund in court," and its failure to cite its own leading cases construing
that phrase, would seem to indicate that it was desirous of avoiding
old controversies. The Rule would be followed when it directly applied, but without the old gusto.
The court was mired in inconsistency. In the week following the
decision in Silverstein, it heard oral argument in Perrella v. Board of
Education,3 01 wherein it was asked to review a judicial allowance of a
307 U.S. 161 (1939).
800 Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
801 51 N.J. 323, 240 A.2d 417 (1968). Silverstein was decided Jan. 17, 1968. Oral argument in Perrella followed on Jan. 22, 1968.
299
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counsel fee in favor of a reinstated employee despite the Rule, under
principles it had established in a prior case involving such an allowance
in a civil service proceeding. Perrella, a lawyer discharged by his Board,
had sought reinstatement and the award of back pay. The trial court
found in his favor, regarded his employment as part-time, and held
he was entitled to full recovery of back pay without any credit in
mitigation of damages for earnings received in his private law practice
during the period in question. It allowed him a counsel fee of $3,000
under the supposed authority of Mastrobattistav. Essex County Park
02
Commission.3
The supreme court reversed, holding that plaintiff had not enjoyed tenure, his employment had been at will and his discharge was
valid. In any case, it regarded the allowance of counsel fee as improper.
In effect, the court, following Mastrobattista, declared that it was
proper to allow a counsel fee only where the award for back pay is
subject to mitigation due to outside earnings. Thus, in the case of
an award for back pay in full without mitigation, as in the trial court
below, Mastrobattista does not authorize the further allowance of a
counsel fee. In that case, said the court,
it seemed just and equitable to give him a credit against the sum
to be applied in mitigation of the reasonable counsel fee and
expenses which he had paid or obligated himself to pay in the
successful prosecution of his action....
. . . It was not our intention to put such employees in a
better position than an ordinary litigant who makes a full recovery
of damages in simple breach of contract cases; nor did we intend to
depart from the view that "sound judicial administration will best
be advanced by having each litigant bear his own counsel fee except in those few situations specially designated in R.R. 4:55-7."303

Thus it would seem that in this context, an allowance of counsel
fees is in the nature of a set-off against the sum of outside earnings,
which in turn is a set-off against the amount of back pay. The court
is clearly adjusting the equities in order to do justice. Just as clearly,
it is laboring in the area of remedies and substantive law; it is idle
to pretend otherwise. Moreover, for some unexplained reason, public
802 46 N.J. 138, 215 A.2d 345 (1965). See note 230 supra for a discussion of this case.
Mastrobattista had been decided on Dec. 20, 1965, the same year in which the court
decided the contract cases: Alcoa, Bergen Builders and Cohen.
803 51 N.J. at 344, 240 A.2d at 428 (quoting from Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos.,
48 N.J. 291, 301, 225 A.2d 328, 334 (1966)). The discussion in Perrelladid have the merit of
at least referring to the basic inconsistency between the holding in Mastrobattista and
the policy of R.R. 4:55-7, although in almost the same breath it denied any departure
from the policy of the Rule.
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employees are given more protection in their suits for breach of contract than other persons. For, in general, there seems to be no indication that anyone else suing in the courts of New Jersey30 4 for breach
of contract is entitled to a set-off for counsel fees where the doctrine
of mitigation of damages has been applied against him. For him, the
policy of "sound judicial administration" apparently requires that he
bear the expense of his own counsel fees. And on the other hand,
for some other unexplained reason, the public employee is given less
protection than the person who, prior to trial, was acute enough to
provide in his contract that in the event of litigation, the losing party
would pay the winner his expense of suit, including reasonable counsel
fees. Apparently, such a person gets his allowance regardless of the mitigation of other damages.
And so, as late as 1968, the inconsistencies abound: substance and
procedure, remedies and considerations of "sound judicial administration," all in a jumble. The court which failed to implement the Le
Duc report because of its "piecemeal approach," resorts more and more
to the same "piecemeal approach." Or it may be more accurate to say
that it was retracing the path of error as slowly as possible so that the
error might not be too obvious. The error, which the contract cases
had revealed, was the determination that the recovery of counsel fees
could be a simple matter of practice and procedure. It was, as in
Perella, a part of the law of remedies, the law of damages for breach of
contract.
In any event, it is understandable that with this history, counsel
in the trial of cases would begin guessing-"Ours may be the appropriate case wherein the court may once again depart from the Rule
and make an ad hoc exception in favor of an allowance." In Board of
Education v. New Jersey Education Association, 05 decided late in
1968, a school board successfully brought suit to restrain a mass resignation of its school teachers and the implementation of certain blacklisting plans of the local and state teachers' organizations, and to compel the teachers to return to work. Having successfully defended an
appeal from these restraints in the supreme court, the board made an
application for counsel fees. In the final paragraph of a lengthy opinion
804 Mastrobattista can perhaps be distinguished on the ground that the trial proceeding in a Civil Service controversy is not in the courts, and thus not covered by
the rules of court. But aside from the question as to whether the courts should operate
under one set of ground rules affecting counsel fees and agencies another, Perrella
established that thereafter, in this type of proceeding, courts would follow the agency
practice as set down in Mastrobattista.
805

53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867 (1968).
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devoted to the rights of public employees, the court briefly adverted to
the matter of counsel fees as follows:
The Board asks for an award of counsel fees. An award is
not authorized by R.R. 4:55-7, as the Board frankly acknowledges.
It urges an award to relieve the taxpayers of the burden of this
litigation. We are not persuaded to depart from the rule. 08
Thus, the court was by then 0 7 adopting the prerogative of petit jurors:
give the remedy or deny it, without reasons or explanation of process,
simply and absolutely because they were or were not persuaded.
But the court was not standing still. Even as it made this pronouncement, it had under preparation the new law on counsel fees,
soon to be found in the 1969 revision of the rules. In that revsion we
would find the court's tentative answer to the perennial problem of
counsel fees: an experimental offer of judgment rule, available in two
counties, alongside the familiar, case-ridden rule on counsel fees still
prevailing in all 21 counties. By this device, counsel fees might be
available to all, on terms. Of course, this would be confusing. Was
such an allowance in that event a matter of practice and procedure, or
of substance and remedy? And would it be in accord with principles
of "sound judicial administration"? And if so, what did that phrase
really mean? It is our next task to examine the court's new creation.
Birth of the New Rule: The Revised Offer of Judgment
The 1969 Revision of the Rules took effect as of September 8,
1969. It contained two pertinent changes. Old R.R. 4:55-7 (counsel
fees) had become R. 4:42-9; old R.R. 4:73 (offer of judgment) had become R. 4:58. New R. 4:42-9 had not substantially changed the former
practice. There was some rearrangement of the remedial provisions.
The rate of recovery in mortgage foreclosures had been raised from
three percent to three and one-half percent on the first $5,000 involved.
And the provision in former R. 4:55-7(d) that "the authority, heretofore vested in the Court of Chancery for the granting of counsel fees in
causes generally, is hereby superseded" had been deleted as, according
to the semi-official Reporter's Comment, "no longer necessary." Presumably, this means that by now everyone knows this to be so.
The Reporter cited the recent cases construing the former rule.
She then referred to the Le Duc report which had recently suggested
that the counsel-fee rule be comprehensively revised and that
808 Id. at 48-49, 247 A.2d at 878.
307 The decision in Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n was the last affecting
counsel fees before the adoption of the new rule on offer of judgment.
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consideration be given to conferring upon the court the discretionary power to award counsel fees in an expanded category of
3 08
actions and under particularly vexatious circumstances.
But, she stated, this had been fully considered at the 1966 Judicial
Conference--objections had been raised there against the proposal on
the grounds of judicial abuse and favoritism, and because of the consequent burden on judicial time that collateral hearings would impose.
The supreme court's rejection of any essential changes in the rule, she
concluded, might be construed as a further expression of these concerns. It will be recalled that it was Chief Justice Weintraub who had
expressed these concerns.30 9
But the rule on counsel fees is only one hand. The rule on offer
of judgment is the other. And it would appear from an examination of
its provisions that the court, in fashioning it, had created a new fundamental inconsistency in the law of counsel fees. For stripped of its circumstantial language, this rule permits the allowance, to a limited
extent, of a reasonable counsel fee,3 10 thereby exposing litigants to
the very same dangers that were the bases for the criticism of the
changes proposed by the Le Duc report-practices in chancery and
the imposition of protracted collateral hearings.
New R. 4:58 was based on former R.R. 4:73, but went beyond
it in several significant respects. Under the old rule, an offer could
be made only by a party defending against a claim; under the new,
it could be made by any party. Again, under the old rule, failure to
accept exposed one only to the payment of costs incurred after the
making of the offer, and, as usually construed, this did not include
counsel fees. Under the new rule, the exposure was expanded to include the sanction of a "reasonable attorney's fee not exceeding
$750.00" plus six percent interest on the amount of any money
recovered. The interest runs from the date of the offer or the date of
completion of discovery (usually the 150th day after service of the
complaint), whichever is later. This liability follows whenever an offeror, his offer having been rejected, recovers a "determination at least
as favorable to him as his offer," except that in "an action for negligence or unliquidated damages" no such right to counsel fees shall
accrue to: (a) a claimant-offeror unless the amount of his recovery "is
808 S. PRESSLER, CuRRENT N.J. COURT RuLEs (Comment R. 4:42-9).

309 See notes 250-53 supra and accompanying text.
310 S. PRESSLER, supra note 308 (Comment R. 4:42-9) (stating that N.J.R. 4:58 does
allow for an award of fees "where a suit is either prosecuted or defended frivolously or
in bad faith").
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in excess of 120 percent of the offer;" or to (b) a defendant-offeror
unless the amount of the recovery for the claimant is in excess of
$750.00 and is less than 80 percent of the offer. 311
As set forth in R. 4:58-4, the provisions of R. 4:58 were applicable
only to the trial divisions of the superior courts of Essex and Middlesex counties and to the county courts of those counties, until further
order of the supreme court. (Subsequently, the rule was made applicable
to the entire state.) Finally, it provided that the new rule would not
apply to matrimonial actions,8 12 presumably because it was not consonant with state policy regarding the disposition of matrimonial actions
and because the allowance of counsel fees is permitted in such actions,
as to matrimonial issues, in the discretion of the trial court (under R.
4:42-9).
There were other sources for R. 4:58 than former R.R. 4:73.
The sanctions for interest and a reasonable counsel fee had been set
forth, it will be recalled, in a proposal advanced at the June, 1966,
Judicial Conference as a possible device tending toward the elimination of "calendar congestion." 318 The rule as promulgated, however,
made two limitations on the allowance of a counsel fee not originally
provided in the proposal. First, it limited the amount of liability for
a reasonable counsel fee to the sum of $750. Second, it proscribed any
liability as to a plaintiff in an action for negligence or unliquidated
damages where the judgment was either for no cause or in an amount
less than $750. The "legislative intent" with regard to the rule, as
stated in the Reporter's Comment, was to "facilitate the settlement of
314
cases."
In sum, then, these were the new changes, as of September 8,
1969: no change in the law of counsel fees, because a scheme of expanded allowance under R. 4:42-9 might tend to revive the former
practice in chancery of fair-haired boys and would surely require protracted collateral hearings to determine good or bad faith; and a
substantial change in the law of counsel fees under R. 4:58 to help
relieve calendar congestion and spare litigants the cost and harassment
of trial. The legislative bases of these two rules are, of course, inconsistent. That this may be manifest we shall next turn to an examination
of these bases and by a natural progression, to an examination of the
inconsistent arrangements made in the rules themselves.
supra note 308 (Comment R. 4:58).
812 N.J.R. 4:58-1.
813 See notes 254-55 supra and accompanying text.
814 S. PRESSLER, supra note 308 (Comment R. 4:58).
811 S. PRESSLER,
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R. 4:58 and R. 4:42-9: Inconsistent Bases and Inconsistent Arrangements
One of the bases for the rejection of any change in the rule regarding counsel fees was the probable requirement of "protracted
hearings" for the purpose of determining a litigant's motivations. This,
it was said, might well result in impositions upon judicial administration and upon litigants outweighing any advantages that might be
anticipated. Yet it will be recalled that at the very session of the Judicial
Conference that this argument had been advanced in order to kill
any suggestion of limited change in the rule regarding counsel fees,
the person making the argument, Chief Justice Weintraub, had also
advanced the contradictory position that adoption of the English and
Canadian practice of allowing counsel fees generally would have a
tremendous impact upon the state of the calendar. Thus only the adverse effect upon the calendar had been considered.
In any case, surely the determination of the "reasonable attorney's
fee" under R. 4:58 would probably also require protracted collateral
hearings, which in turn would result in impositions upon judicial
administration and litigants.A' 5 For no schedule of rates had been
established allowing so much for pleading, so much for discovery and
motions, so much for trial. Instead, this would have to be elaborated
at the trial level, in collateral hearings, with a large amount of variation in practice from county to county, not to say within each county,
from judge to judge.
And, what is "reasonable"? Should the amount in controversy, the
amount set forth in the unaccepted offer, and the amount finally
recovered have a bearing on the amount of the fee to be allowed? In
an action for negligence or for unliquidated damages, should a plaintiff recovering an amount in excess of his offer by 121 percent be
entitled to the same attorney's fee as the plaintiff who recovers in
excess by 150 percent? Should the case for and against liability be
considered? And would it be proper-Mr. Justice Francis in his remarks to the 1966 Judicial Conference declared it would-for the
trial court to consider, in its determination of the "reasonable,"
whether defendant was well-heeled, i.e., represented by an insurance
carrier which could recoup its losses in the form of higher premiums,
or whether plaintiff was ill-heeled, i.e., whether he worked and how
815 Indeed, during the course of the discussion of Proposal No. 8, the forerunner of
N.J.R. 4:58, at the 1966 Judicial Conference, this objection had been raised. No reply was
reported. See note 268 supra and accompanying text.
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much he made? 316 If so, the trial court, without a great deal of guidance,
has been placed in a position of formulating policy involving the redistribution of substantial sums of wealth.
And setting aside those cases which may involve an application
for a counsel fee under R. 4:42-9 and an application for an attorney's
fee under R. 4:58, and setting aside as well those cases wherein an
application for an attorney's fee under a preexisting contractual provision may be affected by the more restrictive provisons of R. 4:58
(the resolution of these issues has not been predetermined in the rules),
what does a trial court do when faced with a motion by one party for
the allowance of a "reasonable attorney's fee" under R. 4:58 and a
counter-motion by his adversary to set aside the verdict as either inadequate or excessive? Will the knowledge that his decision on the countermotion may affect his decision on the original motion influence his
decision on the counter-motion?
It would seem abundantly clear that the determination of what,
under R. 4:58, constitutes a "reasonable attorney's fee" would necessarily require collateral hearings every bit as protracted, if not more
so, as those necessitated by a revision of the rules as contemplated in
the Le Duc report. And given the novelty of the provision, it was more
than likely that the new rule, if taken seriously by the bar, would
generate more than the normal share of appellate questions.317 This
316 See notes 265-66 supra and accompanying text.
317 One such interesting question not mentioned above: in the event of a claimant's
recovery in an amount equal to or in excess of a policy limit in a case where his
adversary is covered by insurance, who is liable for the payment of his counsel fees, his
adversary or the carrier? Will the determination turn on the carrier's good faith in
rejecting the offer? And will good faith in that connection be the same as good faith
for the purpose of determining whether the carrier is responsible for the payment of
any excess?
The answer to that question may be suggested by the decision in Crudup v. Marrero,
57 N.J. 353, 273 A.2d 16 (1971), where the terms of N.J.R. 4:58 were held to apply against
the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund, established by N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61
et seq. (1961), thus requiring payment of a claimant's counsel fee for failure to accept
an offer of judgment as provided in the rule. The majority, relying on the problem of
calendar congestion generated in large part by automobile negligence cases, held that
the rule must generally apply to the Fund. But it also held that counsel for the Fund
may move before trial for a determination by the trial court that for special reasons,
such as the uninsured motorist's failure to appear at the trial or his failure to cooperate
or the like, the terms of the rule should not be applied in the case. 57 N.J. at 361-62,
273 A.2d at 21. The majority did not suggest whether such application should be made
on notice to the adversary. If so, counsel for the Fund will be placed in the unenviable
position of revealing before trial that his side is in bad shape. If not, there may be a
due process question.
In any event, this procedure seems to undercut the policy of judicial economy which
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then is the first of the inconsistencies in the bases for the rules in
question. Rule 4:42-9 would remain unchanged out of fear of protracted collateral hearings, despite the tremendous impact it might
have upon the state of the calendar. Rule 4:58 would be drastically
changed despite the probability of such protracted collateral hearings.
A second basis for the legislative decision to retain the restrictive
rule on counsel fees was the fear of a revival of the former practice
in chancery of favoring "fair-haired boys." Yet it should be apparent
that a trial judge who in the determination of "a reasonable attorney's
fee" under R. 4:58 is empowered to take into consideration the factor
of the well-heeled or the ill-heeled litigant, to weigh in the balance
the amounts offered and recovered together with the case for and
against liability, is in a peculiarly strategic position to take care of his
fair-haired boys. And if it be unwise, for fear of these fair-haired boys,
to expand the category of types of action and the circumstances in
which counsel fees should generally be allowed, it is hard to see why it
is not also unwise to expose litigants to the very same danger through
use of the device of the offer of judgment. It is true that the exposure
is limited to the sum of $750, but the technique of limitation, if properly within the rule-making power, could have been adopted in the
case of counsel fees generally. And furthermore, the trial bar is a limited
bar. The same faces appear before the bench week in and week out. A
steady succession of such "limited" fees could, during the course of a
year, amount to a substantial income for some fair-haired boy. To say
the least, it seems highly inconsistent then for the supreme court to
trust a trial judge with the power of discretion conferred under R. 4:58
and generally to distrust him in the exercise of a similar discretionary
power in the matter of the allowance of counsel fees under R. 4:42-9.
A third basis for a rejection of a liberalization of the rule regardthe operation of the rule is supposed to advance, as Justice Proctor, in his dissent, noted:
Thus, the holding leads to ad hoc decisions on the validity of the Fund's
reasons why it should not be subjected to the sanctions of the rules. These
decisions necessarily consume judicial time and may spawn further litigation. In
any event, there has been no showing by the majority that application of the rules
to the Fund will have any appreciable effect in relieving court congestion. Almost
all drivers today are insured . . . and suits against the Fund constitute a relatively insignificant part of all automobile negligence suits. I am fully aware that
our calendars are congested with automobile negligence cases and that the problem is a pressing one which calls for drastic action. But the answer is certainly
not to expend funds not provided for that purpose especially where the goal
of relieving calendar congestion may not even be furthered.
Id. at 366, 273 A.2d at 23-24. See also the construction problem decided in Stephen
Sussna Assoc. v. Randolph Township, No. A-1707-71 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Feb. 27,
1973), where it was held that the provisions of N.J.R. 4:58-3 do not authorize an allowance for services rendered prior to the making of the offer.
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ing the allowance of counsel fees was the supposed fear that such a
change "might discourage litigants from bringing meritorious actions."
The Le Duc report, we have said, in advocating such a change in
that rule, had confined its recommendations to equity causes and to
actions in condemnation and in lieu of prerogative writ. But under R.
4:58-3, in just such causes-actions not involving "unliquidated damages"--the plaintiff is made liable for the allowance of a counsel
fee up to the amount of $750 should he recover less than that offered
him in a proposal of settlement. True, the effect of this rule may not
be to discourage the filing of meritorious actions in such matters; but
it surely will tend to discourage their trial.8 19 One could save the court
from any further inconsistency in this respect by concluding that it
is not concerned with the number of complaints filed but only with
the number of cases disposed of (as though there were no relation
between the two), and in fact of disposition rather than in the merits
thereof.
These inconsistencies in the basis of the two rules, are reflected,
as we might expect, in the internal arrangements made in the rules
themselves. For instance, R. 4:58 was designed, we were told, for the
relief of calendar congestion in the trial divisions. But apart from the
problem of its administration, R. 4:58 seems rather poorly designed to
accomplish its goal. While there is an increased sanction for the
unjustified failure to accept an offer, the sanction operates in an uneven
and improvident fashion. The plaintiff in "an action for negligence or
other unliquidated damages" is not liable for the allowance of an
attorney's fee in any amount, regardless of the terms of the offer, unless
there be a judgment in his favor in a sum greater than $750. But the
plaintiff in every other kind of action is so liable if the terms of the
offer he rejected were equal to, or better than, the terms of the final
determination, even though the final judgment be less than $750 or,
in fact, nothing at all. Thus by the unequal force of this rule, the court
has placed upon the plaintiff in an action for other than unliquidated
damages a far greater pressure to settle than upon the plaintiff suing
for unliquidated damages. But the plaintiff in "an action for negligence
818 It would seem that an action in condemnation is not contemplated within the
phrase, "or other unliquidated damages." In such an action, it is not the plaintiff but
the defendant who seeks damages.
319 Thus, in Stephen Sussna Assoc. v. Randolph Township, No. A-1707-71 (N.J. Super.
Ct., App. Div., Feb. 27, 1973), the plaintiff, going to trial following his rejection of an
offer of judgment in the sum of $3,500 and obtaining a verdict in the sum of $3,150,
was burdened with an allowance of defendant's attorney's fee in the amount of $550.
Plainly, this is meant as a discouragement to proceeding to trial.
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or other unliquidated damages" is the ordinary personal injury claimant. And such claims account for the majority of all cases pending in
the combined civil lists of the superior and county courts.3 20 And
it is in this section (the trial law divisions of the superior and county
courts) that the most dramatic increases in the number of civil cases
added and undisposed of have occurred in the past decade.3 21 It is in
this section that the problem of delay in the trial of civil actions supposedly resides. In addition, it should be remembered that the entire
course of personal injury litigation is subsidized by the personal injury
bar on the basis of the contingent fee arrangement, and it has been
estimated that approximately one-half of these cases going to trial
22
terminate in a judgment of no cause for action.
In light of these facts we are able to realize that the new rule on
offer of judgment, by exempting from its sanction the one of every
two personal injury plaintiffs who fails to recover a verdict in any
amount, as well as that additional number of such claimants who fail
to recover in an amount greater than $750, has failed to exert its
most effective pressure upon one of the most prominent sources of
calendar congestion-the personal injury lawyer and his personal injury client. Indeed, by maintaining such pressure on the personal
injury defendant (by holding him to the payment of a reasonable
attorney's fee up to the sum of $750 for the unjustified rejection of a
plaintiff's offer) and by increasing the pressure upon him through the
newly created sanction of the award of six percent interest on the
amount of any money recovery, this rule, if anything, is so structured
as to encourage the fruitless litigation of personal injury claims, not
to mention their filing and prosecution.
Let us return to the plaintiff suing for other than negligence
or unliquidated damages. This is the typical suitor in general equity
or probate who files his case and tries it in the chancery division of the
superior court or in the probate division of the county court. In the
last decade there has not been any substantial increase in the business
of these courts-either in the number of cases added or in the number
of cases disposed of. In these courts there has been no problem of calendar congestion. 32 In addition, it should be remembered that in the
ordinary course of affairs, the entire expense of most such litigation is
820 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 256, at 58 (1967-68).

821 See supporting data in ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 256, for the last decade.
The most pronounced general increase in the number of cases added and disposed of
during this period has been in those divisions and courts handling personal injury actions.
822 See note 264 supra and accompanying text.
828 See supporting data in ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 256, for the last decade.
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borne by the plaintiff without the benefit of a subsidizing attorney, and
by the defendant who, unlike the personal injury defendant, is not
ordinarily in the business of defending claims or in the position of
passing his losses along to the public in the form of higher premiums.
Yet despite the absence of calendar congestion in these divisions of the
trial courts, the new rule on offer of settlement applies to these litigants
without exemption, as in obedience to some hidden command: apply
where unnecessary, exempt where needed.324
Having discussed the inconsistencies in the bases of the rules and
in the internal arrangement of R. 4:58, we should next proceed to
what basically is involved in the new provisions set forth in R. 4:58,
the underlying assumptions upon which they rest and the course the
court has chosen in adopting them. The assumptions, it will be seen,
are drastic and far-reaching. Under a cover of inconsistent language and
through the method of pursuing seemingly inconsistent directions, the
court has acquired for itself a new and startling power.
R. 4:58-Calendar Control and the Duty to Settle: A Matter of Administration of the Courts
In examining the changes effected by the amendment embodied
in R. 4:58, we shall first consider the extent of the duty, and the consequent liability for breach of that duty, that it created, as well as
the limits placed upon this new creation in theory and in practice.
We shall next consider the interest recognized and protected by the
creation of this duty and consequent liability, and compare it with
similar interests already recognized and protected. We shall then
search for the basis for the court's power to create such interests and
duties, liabilities and remedies. This will lead us to a discussion of
rule-making power in matters of practice and procedure and in matters
affecting the administration of and in the courts. It will lead us to
distinguish between the administration of justice and the administration
of the courts, and finally to an assessment of what, in the form of R.
4:58, the court has wrought.
The extent of the duty and liability created. First, we should
examine the actual changes effected in R. 4:58. Due to the circumstances in which it was conceived, the amendment embodied in new
R. 4:58 has been shaped in terms of settlement delay. A party becomes
liable for the payment of "a reasonable attorney's fee" for his failure
324 Another inconsistency appears in the language of the rules. N.J.R. 4:42-9 refers
to counsel fees, N.J.R. 4:58 to an attorney's fee. There is no longer a basis for such a
distinction.
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to accept a justifiable offer of settlement on or prior to the 10th day
before the first scheduled date for trial or daily or weekly call (whichever is earliest).
Since the rule has been designated as a weapon against calendar
congestion, the extent of the interest protected and the duty required
has been limited accordingly. Nevertheless, a dilatory defendant may
avoid violating the Rule by an acceptance submitted at the last possible moment. And though violating the Rule, he may yet thereafter
avoid its sanction by settling the case on "the courthouse steps," even
during the trial. For, in the absence of "a verdict or determination,"
the rule's sanction is inoperative. In short, the liability provided is
5
not coextensive with the duty required. 32
There are other practical limits to the protection the rule affords.
Its terms may not apply to authorize an award for services rendered
prior to the making of the offer.3

26

In an action for other than unliqui-

dated damages (with the exception, however, of the collection case
wherein the plaintiff will presumably remain under the superior
protection of his pre-litigation contractual provision, as in Alcoa, et
al.), the offeror will ordinarily have already sustained, prior to the
deadline for acceptance, an attorney's fee in excess of the amount
fixed by the Rule. This is due to work done: legal research and factual
investigation, in preparing and filing the pleadings and motion papers,
and in discovery and in preparation for and attendance at pretrial conference. Therefore, failing settlement, it is he, and not his adversary,
who will in effect have to bear the further considerable expense of his
immediate trial preparation and the conduct of the trial itself.
Nor is the defendant in the ordinary suit for negligence without
his resources. "He" is usually in reality a liability insurance company;
his opponent, insofar as control of the case is concerned, is in reality
not the plaintiff, but the personal injury attorney. These two, the
plaintiff's lawyer and the insurance company through its claim manager and adjuster, do business together daily. They are a team, each
member of which depends for his very economic existence upon the
other. And the spirit of the team will frequently demand that the one
325 See note 341 infra.
326 It has been so held in Stephen Sussna

Assoc. v. Randolph Township, No.
A-1707-71 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Feb. 27, 1973). The court reasoned that to allow
an award for services rendered prior to the making of the offer would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the rule, which is to encourage settlement. A party might otherwise
delay settling. This does not seem sound. If the offer carries with it a potential for a
lesser amount of liability because the award cannot include prior services, it poses a
lesser menace to the offeree and furnishes a correspondingly lesser incentive to settle.
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side not become too rough with the other. There will be other cases,
other chances in which to even the score. Moreover, in the case at
hand, the defendant who is offered a set of terms for settlement may
counter with an offer of his own. And since the evaluation of the
amount of a jury's verdict is a matter of art rather than science, since
the substantial miscalculation by the plaintiff's attorney in failing to
accept the counter-offer may wipe out, by an order of payment of the
defendant's attorney's fee, the substantial part of the limited recovery
in the plaintiff's favor and thus the substantial part of the plaintiff's attorney's fee, the attorney for the plaintiff may regard it the better part
of wisdom not to serve an offer in the first instance. In view of these
circumstances, and in view of the fact that the reasonable figure for
settlement is often at substantial variance with the probable returns of
a proper jury verdict, 327 it should come as no surprise that the personal
injury bar at whom this device was purportedly aimed has not warmed
28
to the heat of its protection.8
The extent of the interest recognized and protected. The foregoing limitations in the extent of the rule and its utility in practice
should not, however, be allowed to dull our appreciation of its actual
worth and meaning. The rule does tend to protect a litigant from the
unjustified costs of trial, including therein the costs of the immediate
preparation for trial. And by casting the rule in terms of a settlement
deadline, the court has, to the limited extent involved, recognized a
litigant's interest in freedom from the unjustified expenses of trial and
immediate trial preparation. This interest is similar to others it has
already recognized and protected in prior cases: a person's interest in
freedom from litigation unjustifiably commenced 29 and his interest
in freedom from litigation unjustifiably pursued. 80
Indeed, this interest, insofar as it is protected by R. 4:58, is much
broader than those. For the injustice in malicious prosecution is the
malice involved in the severity of the sanction pressed--criminal detention, injunctions, etc.,-with lack of probable cause. Harassment and
the infliction of emotional anxiety constitute an integral part of the
tort. The injustice in unjustifiably pursuing litigation is not nearly
327 See note 267 supra and accompanying text; Editorial, The Offer of Judgment
Rule-R. 4:58, 92 N.J.L.J. 404 (1969).
328 Editorial, supra note 327; Editorial, Congested Calendars II, 93 N.J.L.J. 728
(1970).
329 Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 175, 83 A.2d 246, 264 (Ch.
1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952) (discussed in detail beginning at note 159
supra and accompanying text).
330 Allegro v. Afton Village Corp., 9 N.J. 156, 87 A.2d 430 (1952) (discussed in
detail beginning at note 161 supra and accompanying text).
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so grave: the breach of a recognized rule of practice and procedureintentionally or not-so as to cause one's adversary the unnecessary
expenditure of time and money. But under R. 4:58, the injustice
remedied consists of the failure to have settled the case on the terms
offered, when as it turns out it should have been settled. The interest
that this rule protects is closer in kind to those recognized and protected in the contract cases (Alcoa and Cohen) and in the companion
rule, R. 4:42-9 (except for the provision therein regarding "fund in
court" which rests on the principle of prevention of group unjust
enrichment). It is the interest in freedom from the cost of litigation
itself, regardless of good or bad faith and regardless of proper compliance with all the required forms of practice and procedure. (Nevertheless it should be noted that, as in the case of the agreements regarding the recovery of an attorney's fee, not all litigants are equally protected with respect to these interests. In the case of contract, a bondholding land mortgagee is limited to the rates established by the rule
on counsel fee. 331 And in the case of a defendant in an action for
unliquidated damages, the rule on offer of settlement limits him to
a set-off. He is barred from any recovery for attorney's fees unless his
adversary first recovers a judgment in excess of $750, and under the
cover of unreasonableness, he may be limited in his recovery in the
38 2
case of an ill-heeled plaintiff.)
The remedies of the rule and the basis in power therefor. The
remedies allowed by R. 4:58 for an impingement upon the litigant's
rights may not be slight. Six percent interest on a judgment for unliquidated damages of $5,000 for a period of two years amounts to $600,
and that, together with an allowance of a reasonable attorney's fee in
the maximum amount of $750, would constitute an addition to the
basic judgment of more than 25 percent. Such an addition to the basic
judgment of more than 25 percent. Such an addition could hardly be
called "incidential" to the remedy for which the action was commenced.
881 This was established in Bank of Commerce v. Markakos, 22 N.J. 428, 126 A.2d
346 (1956) (discussed in detail beginning at note 141 supra and accompanying text).
In turn, this influenced the amount of protection to be given a noteholder whose security
was in a land mortgage. Bergen Builders, Inc. v. Horizon Developers, Inc., 44 N.J. 435,
210 A.2d 65 (1965) (discussed in detail beginning at note 219 supra and accompanying
text).
832 See Gaster v. Coldiron, - Del. -, 297 A.2d 384 (1972), where it was held that
a state statute allowing recovery of counsel fees by successful plaintiffs in mechanics' lien
cases, but not by successful defendants, denied equal protection. The court gave weight
to the fact that the plaintiff in the case before it was a corporate subcontractor presumably not in special need, and that plaintiffs in other types of contract actions are not
similarly protected.
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It is hard to believe that these remedial provisions could be considered merely "a matter of practice and procedure" or termed "a
procedural sanction" after the many decisions we have discussed: the
contract cases, the suit for trademark infringement and the suit for
reinstatement to a municipal position. For, in none of these cases did
the recovery of an attorney's fee depend upon compliance with the
rule regarding counsel fees, the then R.R. 4:55-7. Allowances in these
cases were a matter of judicial remedy awarded in recognition and
protection of substantive interests. Nevertheless, despite these and
other precedents and the tattered history of the rule regarding counsel
fees, the court thereafter undertook a defense of the sanctions set forth
in the rule regarding an offer of judgment and their absolute applicability in just these terms. In Crudup v. Marrero,38 it held that the
provisions of R. 4:58 applied to a case brought under the Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fundas 4 in the proper countya" as "a remedial
measure" provided for in the act establishing and regulating the Fund,
and, in any event, as "a procedural sanction . . . within our broad

constitutional power."as 6
It would be idle to mount a refutation of the second alternative
ground for decision. More than enough has been written on that subject in this study already. The first basis for decision, that the statute
creating the Fund included the sanctions of R. 4:58 in providing for
the payment of a judgment up to a $10,000 maximum for one accident
plus "interests and costs,"

33

7

stands on equally insubstantial ground.

As the dissenting opinion of Justice Proctor pointed out, the statute
was enacted many years before the rule at issue. The "interest" referred
to in the statute, he said, never contemplated interest on proposed
settlement offers, but rather the interest payable on the judgment of
liability. And counsel fees, he considered, were not included in the
statutory concept of "costs." Moreover, the Fund had not been in sound
financial condition in recent years. He concluded that the rule-created
sanctions were beyond the intentment of the legislature and should not
338
apply to the Fund.
But, as is often the case when a holding is based up on alternate,
inadequate grounds, a third and equally inadequate is set down for
333 57 N.J. 353, 273 A.2d 16 (1971). See note 317 supra.

334 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 et seq. (1961).
835 Rule 4:58, as of the date of the opinion in Crudup (Jan. 25, 1971), still applied

only to actions brought in the trial divisions of the superior and county courts in Essex
and Middlesex counties.
336 57 N.J. at'361, 273 A.2d at 21.
337
338

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961).
57 N.J. at 364-65, 273 A.2d at 22-23.
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supposedly good measure. The majority opined that the grant of interest and counsel fees under the rules is "well within the inherent
powers of this Court." 389 It recalled that R. 4:58 was designed as a
mechanism to encourage early out-of-court settlement of negligence
and unliquidated damage claims that "in justice and reason" ought to
be settled without trial. 340 And in support, it detailed the latest available figures regarding the state of the trial calendar in the trial law
divisions of the superior and county courts.8 41 It concluded that its new
rule was "a remedial measure in operation on a test basis and designed
to produce early out-of-court settlements. '342 Judging, then, from the
association of the problem of calendar congestion with the assertion of
a supposed power to compel or pressure settlements, the court seems to
be suggesting, as it has before, that it has the final authority to determine the number of cases pending in the state court system as part of
its control over "the administration of the courts," over which it has
348
the absolute power to make rules under the constitution.
We have mentioned before that the court, in pursuit of this misId. at 361, 273 A.2d at 21. To this, Justice Proctor replied in his dissent:
If the grant of interest and counsel fees is within the inherent power of this
Court, even a specific legislative prohibition against such interest and fees
contained within the statute would be ineffective. I cannot accept that proposition ....
I can only conclude that the statute does not provide for counsel
fees or for the kind of interest contemplated by R. 4:58-1 et seq. And since we
do not have any inherent power to order the expenditure of public funds in this
area, the rules should not apply to the Fund.
Id. at 365-66, 273 A.2d at 23. This is reminiscent of the arguments made in dissent by
Justices Heher and Jacobs in State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1953), to
the effect that the rule on counsel fees should not apply to the allowance of a
counsel fee to a company involved in an escheat proceeding because not contemplated
within the provisions of the Escheat Act, on the theory that where state revenues are
concerned, the intent of the legislature should be paramount. See notes 81-82 supra and
accompanying text. Apparently, these many years later, Justice Jacobs had abandoned this
position; in Crudup, he supported the majority.
340 57 N.J. at 357, 273 A.2d at 18.
341 Id. The court's figures showed that there were 28,275 automobile negligence
actions pending in the superior and county courts at the end of the 1969-70 court year.
During that year, 6,985 automobile negligence cases were settled on the trial date;
6,157 were settled between institution of suit and trial; and only 1,746 were tried to
completion by a jury. But, if this is so, it is evident once again that the rule regarding
offer of judgment is ill-conceived. It is aimed at early settlement, but by its terms as
presently written, it does not apply to those 6,985 cases (assuming they were all brought
in counties affected by the rule) settled on trial date, since they were settled. Rather
it would apply only to the 1,746 of them actually tried to completion by a jury (again
assuming they were tried in counties affected by the rule), since they were not settled.
Not only does the rule penalize those who insist on their day in court, the small minority
of litigants, but it does not do the job it is supposed to do very effectively.
842 57 N.J. at 361, 273 A.2d at 21.
848 N.J. CONsr.art. 6, § 2,
3.
339
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sion against calendar congestion, seemed to be confusing the administration of justice, over which it has rule-making power under the
constitution, with the administration of the courts. It would be well to
recall these confusions at this time. During the discussion at the 1966
Judicial Conference relating to the proposal to provide in the rules for
the allowance of interest in personal injury cases, the Justice in charge
of the discussion had conceded the involvement of a principle of substantive law, but had insisted: "Our primary concern is whether this
was [sic] a device which could help expedite trials. ' 344 Thereafter, the
same jurist announced in Gerhardt that the plaintiff was to be denied
the allowance of a counsel fee in the proceeding because "sound judicial administration will best be advanced by having each litigant bear
his own counsel fee" except in those situations designated in R.R.
4:55-7.3 46 Later, the allowance of a counsel fee in Red Devil was to be
justified in part on the thesis, again advanced by the same jurist, that
"the administration of justice will be better served by substituting an
award of litigation costs for an ill-suited and more burdensome accounting."3 46 And within a week of the decision in Red Devil, the
court had given formal notice of its consideration of the proposed
amendment to the then existing rule on offer of settlement, which as
adopted became the present R. 4:58.
But, to repeat and amplify the distinction we have made before,
the administration of justice and the administration of the courts,
while both resident in the judicial branch of government and its
primary responsibility, are separate operations. Each has its own distinct purposes, and consequently, each its own distinct limits in operation. And, in view of the court's claim of "inherent" powers, it must be
emphasized that neither of these operations is the exclusive concern of
the judiciary.
We should first consider the administration of justice, because it
is for this reason that courts exist at all; whereas the administration of
the courts is a secondary or ancillary operation enabling the courts to
better administer justice. The administration of justice concerns the
peaceful adjudication of controversies, according to law, in courts acting within the proper spheres of their respective jurisdictions. The law
controlling the decision of the controversy may be either statutory or
constitutional, thus involving the construction of the breadth and
344 ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,

supra note 247, at 4 (Afternoon Session, June 17,

1966).
845 See note 278 supra and accompanying text.
846

See note 289 supra and accompanying text.
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depth of a legislative or constitutional provision, or it may be "common," that is, to be gleaned from a study of the pertinent judicial
precedents.
But whether it be a question of judgment as to what it was that
the legislature or the constitutional convention did intend, or whether
it be a matter of evaluating the weight and thrust of prior caselaw
determinations, the power to establish the reach of the law, the number
and kind of rights it will protect and vindicate, is too important a
matter to be left to the court's decision alone. For one man's right is
another man's duty, and one man's remedy is another man's liability.
And if the judges of these courts who tell us what the law is (whether
they declare it to be so or make it, is for us here and now, not of the
essence, though probably judges who frankly say they make law rather
than declare it are likely to be more inclined to legal change and the
creation of new claims) 3 47 must, in order to do their jobs without fear
or favor, have tenure and be free from the demeaning requirements of
periodic election and reelection, and so must the people have resort to
another agency of government capable of overriding these judgments
of policy. Judicial tenure implies legislative supremacy. And the power
to administer justice implies a countervailing power to overrule the
minister.
There is another basic reason for the necessarily subordinate role
of the judiciary in the administration of justice. An increase in the
number of rights afforded judicial protection and vindication increases
necessarily the number of complaints filed with the courts for remedy.
Inevitably, the number of cases added increases the number of judges
required for their disposition, as well as the number of chambers and
the number of courtrooms required for their use, and the number of
personnel, supplies and space needed for their support. Eventually this
leads to the demand for the construction of larger and more adequate
courthouses. The costs of these capital improvements and operating
expenses, including salaries, are a charge on the revenues of government, and as such are subject to that branch of government directly
847 See address of Chief Justice Weintraub at Rutgers Law School, Newark, N.J.,
on Sept. 10, 1966, reported in 89 N.J.L.J. 618 (1966):
When I came to the Supreme Court of this State just ten years ago, its
members were earnestly debating whether the judicial branch of government
could legitimately make law. I suppose the topic is still lively in some places,
but so far as our Court is concerned, the debate is over. We have no doubt
that courts make law, always did, and in the nature of our government cannot
escape that responsibility. Indeed, the tempo of events is such that the total
effort of all three branches of government cannot keep the law in touch with

the needs of our society.
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charged with the appropriation of money for governmental expenses
848
and with the ways and means of raising the corresponding revenue.
Legislative supremacy thus implies a measure of cost control and the
power to overrule the court in the expansion or contraction of the
rights to be protected and vindicated. There are then two important
reasons for insisting upon the necessity of judicial subordination to
legislative power in the administration of justice: one resident in control over the conduct of the people, the other in the expense to the
public purse.
Nevertheless, it must be stated that once the legislative appropriation has been made for the administration of justice, the primary responsibility for its proper expenditure is in the judicial branch of
government. Cost control of judicial business is primarily the business
of judges, and the proper administration of the courts is basically the
art of cost control of judicial business.3 49
This principle has been elevated to the level of a constitutional
dictate in New Jersey and provided for in a systematic manner. The
1947 constitution provides: "The Supreme Court shall make rules
governing the administration of all courts in the State." It designates
the Chief Justice of the supreme court as the administrative head of
all the courts and empowers him to appoint an administrative director
of these courts to serve at his pleasure.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule-making power, and in an attempt
to operate a cost-efficient system of courts, the supreme court has
adopted certain rules formally termed "Administrative." These rules,
R. 1:30 to 1:38 inclusive, cover such appropriate matters as court
schedules, locations for the transaction of court business, the judicial
and clerical reports of judicial business, etc. Under R. 1:33-1, the Chief
Justice appoints a judge of the superior court as each county's assignment judge who, according to R. 1:33-3(a), is responsible for the administration of civil and criminal justice and for the administration of
all courts in the county for which he is named. Included in his dutiesand this leads us back to the main subject-is the "supervision and
expeditious movement of the civil and criminal trial calendars" of all
courts in the county. Under R. 1:33-4, every judge is held responsible
for the orderly administration of his own court, including more specifically the supervision of its calendar.
348 The interrelation of these factors has been clearly and ably demonstrated in
the Aug. 17, 1970 speech of Chief Justice Burger before the American Bar Association.
56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).

849 Id.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:421

Unquestionably, the supervision and the expeditious movement
of the civil and criminal trial calendars is a worthy goal and properly
within the administrative control of the courts. Efficiency in calendar
control effects a service to that segment of the public which courts are
constituted to serve: the litigants. A timely calendar is an essential condition of the proper administration of justice.
Nevertheless, things must be kept in that perspective. A current
calendar is desirable so that each litigant may be given his day in court
in due season. Any device aimed at making the calendar current must,
as a means of court administration, be fashioned and employed for the
full and proper administration of justice; it cannot be or become an
end in itself. And it cannot, as a means, operate in such a way as to
interfere with the proper administration of justice: full and fair trial
of issues of law and fact in our courts.
One such early device aimed at calendar control was the settlement
conference, whether at pretrial or at trial, involving the judge, counsel
and clients. 350 Settlement may mean not only time and expense saved
for litigants and courts, but in many cases, a solution of the controversy
in a fair compromise, sparing the litigants the pressures of trial. But
settlement is not always fair. Nor are the conferences for settlement
frequently enough successful. 351 And sometimes the pressures to settle
have an undesirable effect upon the participating judge-his judgment
regarding the terms of a fair compromise may improperly affect his
later trial of the case. In addition, under pressure to keep the calendar
current, disposition by settlement rather than by adjudication may in
practice become, for the judiciary, the preferable method of case determination. Thus, settlement comes to be regarded not as a means to
the quicker adjudication of cases, but as an end in itself.
350 At pretrial, the recently repealed rule was explicit that counsel should come to
the conference "prepared to discuss settlement." N.J.R. 4:25-3(d) (1970). However, the
practice of the settlement conference on the day of trial, either with the aid of the
judge to whom the case has been assigned for trial or with that of a judge specially
assigned to preside at all such conferences, has been and is a matter of custom, handled
largely without benefit of rule. See R. 1:2-1.
551 In the settlement of a personal injury claim, a thorough knowledge of the laws
of torts, insurance, jurisdiction and evidence, and of the human anatomy would seem
to be a requisite. Usually judges who were once personal injury trial lawyers make the
most proficient settlers of this type of claim. Their assessment of the settlement range
amounts almost to a trial by judge. See the recommendation in Editorial, Calendar
Congestion V-Block Busting, 93 N.J.L.J. 760 (1970), for a greater utilization of this
type of judge in the settlement of cases, and for the training of the less knowledgeable
judiciary in the development of comparable skills. How extensive such a program can
become without practically impairing a party's right to trial by jury is difficult to say
beforehand.
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In the adoption of R. 4:58 in the 1969 revision, this policy becomes formally established. For violation of the now preferred order,
for a refusal to settle a case on terms, the losing party will pay to his
adversary a substantial sum for having called upon the judges to act as
judges and not as mediators-the sanction of 6 percent interest on the
judgment for unliquidated damages and a reasonable attorney's fee.
In actuality, we have the worst of all possible worlds. In R. 4:58
we have a real change in the law of counsel fees as previously contained
in R. 4:42-9 and its predecessor rules and in the "exceptional" line of
cases. But because the previously used basis for the adoption of R.
4:42-9, that counsel fees were a matter of practice and procedure, had
by now worn desperately thin, the proposed basis for the amendment
in R. 4:58 affecting counsel fees has been placed on an alternate
ground-"inherent powers." Rule 4:58, then, constitutes a far more
dangerous abuse of the court's rule-making power than the prior and
current rules regarding the allowance of counsel fees generally. The
latter involves an incidental intrusion into the areas of substantive law
and the law of remedies in the name of practice and procedure. But R.
4:58 represents a systematic perversion of the adjudicatory process of
the entire trial system in the name of, presumably, the proper administration of the courts.
Perspective and Later Developments
The 1969 Revision of the Rules had indeed introduced a substantial complication to the law affecting counsel fees. To avoid the
abuse of judicial favoritism and to husband judicial time, the basic
rule, now R. 4:42-9, had not been changed. Counsel fees would
ordinarily be denied so that supposedly thereby each litigant would
bear the burden of his own expense. On the other hand, to induce
timely settlement (and despite the possibility of favoritism and the
possible loss of judicial time) another rule had been amended, R. 4:58,
to permit limited counsel fees after an offer of judgment, thereby shifting the burden of litigation to that extent.
With this new pattern of basic inconsistency it was not to be expected that thereafter the law on counsel fees would be simplified.
Predictably then, the first of the cases subsequently decided, Risley v.
Kirkman, 52 permitted a counsel fee under the basic rule, R. 4:42-9,
even though the allowance ran counter to its stated policy of requiring
a litigant to bear his own expenses. In Risley, the supreme court decided that a widow, successful in having the sole named beneficiary
852

56 N.J. 464, 267 A.2d 50 (1970).
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under her late husband's will declared a trustee of his estate for her
needs, was entitled thereby to an allowance. However, it denied her
any allowance for her unsuccessful efforts to set the will aside for undue
influence. Said the court:
[I]t is consonant with our principles to charge against the corpus
of the trust the expenses incurred in establishing its terms. We
think the situation in principle is the same as the more familiar
case in which a disputed will is offered for probate. There allowances may be made out of the estate, R. 4:42-9(a)(3). Here it
equally serves the will and intent of the testator to establish the
terms of the trust.
... To require the widow to bear the cost of establishing the
trust and its terms would, on the facts of this case, run against
the very purpose of the trust, i.e., the fulfillment
of the testator's
853
primary aim that her actual needs be met.
Yet, stripped of its form, the case was one between simple adversaries: the widow and the sole named beneficiary. True, that test
had been formulated in Sunset and Grober to determine the meaning
of "fund in court," the key phrase in R. 4:42-9(a)(2), and the disposition in Risley had been made under R. 4:42-9(a)(3). But was this correct? The beneficiary in Risley had acknowledged some obligation to
the widow, disputing only its extent. The case was therefore not like
that of a disputed will offered for probate, but like a typical action to
construct a trust. But such a case had long been held to justify an
allowance to the successful beneficiary as out of a "fund in court"
despite the fact that, in suing, the beneficiary may have been suing
only in his own behalf.35 4 Did Risley intend to undermine this holding
further and prepare the way for another revision in the case law
whereby an allowance to a non-fiduciary in an action for will or trust
construction will be justified under the terms of R. 4:42-9(a)(3) rather
than (2)? If so, the formula, which provides that an award may be made
out of moneys actually in the custody of the court and the subject of
litigation, heretofore stripped by Sunset and Grober of the protection
of subsection (2), will then finally find a resting place in the language
of subsection (3).355
Involving as it did a widow, Risley recalls the case of another
widow, Mrs. Plews of Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews856 She, it will
353 Id. at 471, 267 A.2d at 54. Rule 4:42-9(a)(3) was formerly N.J.R.R. 4:55-7(e), discussed beginning at note 112 supra and accompanying text.
854 See discussion beginning at note 110 supra and accompanying text.
355 See discussion at notes 196-201 supra and accompanying text.
856 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950) (discussed in detail beginning at note 41 supra and
accompanying text).
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be remembered, was not permitted an allowance even as against a
fiduciary for hire, guilty of flagrant, fraudulent self-dealing, simply because the Rule did not so provide. Grober had very recently reaffirmed
this holding. 857 Under the next case we are to discuss, relief for Mrs.
Plews may be on the way some 20 years later, not under the rule of
counsel fees, but under an alternate theory. In Security Aluminum
Window Manufacturing Corp. v. Lehman Associates, Inc., the appellate division held such a fiduciary liable in punitive damages, quoting
with approval the following words:
"[O]nce it has been shown that one trained and experienced holds
himself out to the public as worthy to be trusted for hire to perform services for others, and those so invited do place their trust
and confidence, and that trust is intentionally and consciously
disregarded, and exploited for unwarranted gain, community protection, as well as that of the victim, warrants the imposition of
punitive damages. .

.

. Punitive damages are particularly apt in

such circumstances because they both punish the wrongdoer, and
offer the wronged a greater incentive to bring derelicts to justice a
process which can subject the victim to considerable expense and
trouble."8 58
The court cited in support McCormick's treatise on damages,
which was cited earlier in our discussion of Liberty Title in support of
the argument for an allowance for counsel fees as a proper remedy.8 5 9
Security involved a real estate broker, but, of course, should apply to a
paid trustee. Thus, while Mrs. Plews may today still not be able to
recover an allowance for counsel fees in a similar situation, she should
be able to recover an award in punitive damages. The legal effect is
much the same:8 60 a defrauding fiduciary will be liable in damages to
his victim so that she will be relieved thereby of the expense of litigation. Once again, the basic policy underlying R. 4:42-9 has been set
aside.
Shortly after the decision in Security, still another exception to
the rule against counsel fee allowances was made for a property owner
in a condemnation proceeding where the damage award was far in
excess of the condemnor's pretrial offer. In New Jersey Turnpike
Authority v. Bayonne Barrel & Drum Co.,8 61 the jury had returned a
verdict for $2,767,000 following an offer of $900,000. Despite a recent
See discussion at p. 434-35 infra.
108 N.J. Super. 137, 143, 260 A.2d 248, 252 (App. Div. 1970) (emphasis added).
859 See note 51 supra.
857

858

360 The amount of damages would be the same if the punitive damages allowable
under Security are the reasonable expenses of litigation.
861 110 N.J. Super. 506, 266 A.2d 164 (L Div. 1970).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:421

holding of the supreme court in Housing Authority v. Valentino36 2
that no allowance may be made in condemnation, the trial court justified its award under the provisions of R. 4:73-5 allowing "costs" in
condemnation and under the supposed requirements of the New Jersey
constitution that payment for the taking of private property be made
in "just compensation."
Bayonne Barrel had a short career however. It was expressly disapproved two years later by the appellate division in State v. Mandis63
on the authority of Valentino and the provisions of R. 4:42-9. Any
allowance for a counsel fee in condemnation was denied. Of course, the
holding in Mandis would seem to be correct, i.e. in accord with the
explicit provisions of the rules and with the supposed policy that each
litigant bear his own cost of litigation. But the position taken in
Bayonne Barrel, as we have just seen, is also not without support in
the precedents. That is the problem: a trial judge can never tell when,
as in the case of Risley, the supreme court, in the exercise of its judicial
power, will construe a rule so as to incorporate a new exception; or
when, in the exercise of its legislative power, it will reverse its own
judicial precedents, and, by adding a new paragraph, rule a new exception.
Effective September 13, 1971, the court followed the latter course.
Amending the rule on counsel fees to provide for an allowance in favor
of a successful claimant in "an action upon a liability or indemnity
policy of insurance," it overruled its earlier holding in Gerhardt v.
Continental Insurance Cos. 364 Once again, this time legislatively, the
court had decreed that a litigant need not bear the burden of his own
47 N.J. 265, 268, 220 A.2d 196, 198 (1966).
119 N.J. Super. 59, 290 A.2d 154 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 61 N.J. 156, 293 A.2d
386 (1972). The award in Mandis was made by order of the trial court entered Apr. 8,
1971; the appeal was taken on Apr. 21, 1972. The appellate division referred in passing
to the "Eminent Domain Act of 1971," N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:3-1 to 50 (Supp. 1972-73),
which became effective on Dec. 21, 1971, while the case was on appeal. The opinion
noted that an original proposal for an award of expenses for a condemnee recovering
compensation in an amount exceeding the amount on deposit with the court by 25 percent
or more had been deleted. It did not refer to the finally-enacted provisions of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 20:3-26(b), (c) (Supp. 1972-73), providing for an allowance of expenses, including
fees, to a condemnee when: the condemnor has been held not to have the power to
acquire the property by condemnation; the condemnor has abandoned the proceedings;
or the condemnor has been forced to commence condemnation proceedings by the
property owner.
364 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966) (discussed at length beginning at note 276 supra
and accompanying text). Gerhardt's holding had already been undermined in Butler v.
Bonner & Barnewall, Inc., 56 N.J. 567, 572 n.l, 267 A.2d 527, 530 (1970), where the court
suggested that the issue of an allowance in a suit seeking a determination of coverage
was an open one. Gerhardt, unaccountably, was not cited.
362
363
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expenses. In this instance, considerations of seemliness rather than of
basic equity probably were determinative. It looked bad, as in Gerhardt, to allow the assured the expense incurred for counsel in a prior
case improperly undefended by the insurance company, but to disallow
him the expense incurred for counsel in cases in which he sought to
establish the improper conduct.
And so it stands: R. 4:42-9 disallowing counsel fees with its various
exceptions as a matter of practice and procedure; R. 4:58, allowing
them to a limited extent in any case upon an offer of judgment in the
name of judicial administration; and on the side, the various judicial
exceptions, such as the contract cases, conceded by the court to be areas
of substantive right and obligation beyond, for now, the reach of the
Rule.
CONCLUSIONS

The Piecemeal Approach
The first of the conclusions that may be drawn is that there is no
law of counsel fees in the state of New Jersey in the generally understood meaning of the term. Instead, relating to the subject is a collection of rules and cases adopted and decided over the years in solution
of particular problems and in adjustment to particular interests. The
approach to these problems and interests has been piecemeal, lacking
an overall systemizing theory. And the effect has been disorderly. Its
lead sentence continues to read: "No fee for legal services shall be
allowed in the taxed costs or otherwise, except .

. . ."

Its basic policy:

each litigant must bear the burden at his own expense.
The first of the exceptions provided for, formerly in R.R. 4:557(a), now in R. 4:42-9(a)(1), is the matrimonial action, but not as "to
nonmatrimonial issues joined with matrimonial issues" in such an
action. The scope of the grant is broad: the court in its discretion may
make an allowance to be paid by any of the parties to the action, charging, if deemed to be just, any party successful in the action. As the
cases have made clear, the critical factors to be considered in the use of
this discretion include the need and the ability to pay of the respective
parties, probable cause, oppressive tactics and immoral or illegal behavior. 65 In this instance, then, the prior broad discretionary power in
365 For the sake of brevity, a discussion of these cases, which have followed along the
traditional line of a broad discretionary power in chancery to do equity, has been
omitted from the text. A detailed study of their holdings would only demonstrate further
that in this area, from the beginning, the court was concerned neither with confining
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chancery, the power to do equity in judgment, has been preserved, and
the burden of litigation cast upon an opposing party.
Secondly excepted, formerly by R.R. 4:55-7(b) and now by R.
4:42-9(a)(2), is an allowance "out of a fund in court." It has now been
established that there is a "fund" "when it would be unfair to saddle
the full cost upon the litigant ...[who] is doing more than merely advancing his own interests." 36 6 In this exception, the burden is cast on
persons in whose favor the allowance is made, based on the principle of
the prevention of unjust enrichment. Thus it does not involve the
possibility of an allowance imposed upon an opposing party. Litigants
who qualify include: the genuine class suitor who creates or preserves
a fund; 36 7 one who, though unsuccessful, had a meritorious and complicated claim; 68 one who successfully participates in a declaratory
369
judgment proceeding regarding such a fund, even as a defendant;
37
0
the successful spurious class suitor; the successful stockholder suing
derivatively for his corporation; 37 1 the interpleader, but only for his
each litigant to the payment of his or her own expenses, nor with the possibility of
favoring "fair haired boys." As for the bases for such awards:
Generally, there are several important elements which are considered when
a wife applies for counsel fees and other suit monies-the wife's necessity, the
husband's financial ability, and the wife's good faith and probable success.
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 52 N.J. Super. 504, 506, 145 A.2d 796, 797 (App. Div. 1958). Where a
woman has substantial independent means, the need does not exist. Schluter v. Schluter,
23 N.J. Super. 409, 93 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1952).
As for an allowance based in part on a defending husband's "resistant attitude,"
there is authority for such an allowance in Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 356, 122
A.2d 352, 359-60 (1956). And according to the standard authority, the prior practice was
to allow a fee to a woman even though she lost where it was apparent that the husband's
conduct was such as to give the wife cause for bringing her suit. See cases collected in
12 J. LODGE, N.J. PRACriCE, § 1606, at 123-24 (3d ed. 1963). On the other hand, see
Schwartzstein v. Schwartzstein, 94 N.J. Super. 590, 229 A.2d 666 (Ch. 1967), in which the
court assessed the plaintiff-wife for the counsel fees of her husband where she not
only lost the case, but admitted the commission of a matrimonial offense and was held
to have perjured herself in facie curiae.
366 Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 168, 162 A.2d 834, 837
(1960) (discussed at length beginning at note 190 supra and accompanying text).
367 Cintas v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 301, 32 A.2d 90 (Ch. 1943)
(discussed beginning at note 101 supra and accompanying text).
368 Milberg v. Seaboard Trust Co., 7 N.J. 236, 81 A.2d 142 (1951) (discussed in detail
beginning at note 104 supra and accompanying text).
369 Leeds & Lippincott Co. v. Nevius, 30 N.J. 281, 153 A.2d 45 (1959) (discussed
beginning at note 208 supra and accompanying text).
370 Silverstein v. Shadow Lawn Savings & Loan Ass'n, 51 N.J. 30, 237 A.2d 474
(1968) (discussed beginning at note 298 supra and accompanying text).
871 Sarner v. Sarner, 38 N.J. 463, 185 A.2d 851 (1962) (discussed at length beginning
at note 210 supra and accompanying text).
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petition for interpleader; 72 the partitioner, whether for two or for
many; 73 the administrator of a trust or an estate, as contemplated in
the Rule itself;3

74

the successful suitor for removal of a trustee or ex-

ecutor; 75

all participants in an action for will construction urging
meritorious arguments; 76 the successful next friend to an incompetent
or minor; 77 and, the escheatee in aid of the state, as well as the state,
in an escheat proceeding.3 78 Despite earlier language, 879 the mere presence of moneys in the custody of the court which are the subject of
litigation, does not constitute a "fund. 38 0 Thus the assets of a partnership or joint venture actually in court by virtue of a receivership do not
constitute such a "fund," even though a breach of fiduciary duty may
88
be involved, a fortiori, if no such assets are before the court.
By a third exception, formerly found in R.R. 4:55-7(e) and now in
R. 4:42-9(a)(3), provision is made for an allowance to be paid by the
opposing party in an action contesting the probate of a will or codicil,
872 Sunset Beach Amusement Park Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 162 A.2d 834 (1960)
(discussed at length beginning at note 190 supra and accompanying text).
373 Baird v. Moore, 50 N.J. Super. 156, 141 A.2d 324 (App. Div. 1958); Lipin v. Ziff,
53 N.J. Super. 443, 147 A.2d 601 (Ch. 1959) (both discussed in note 205 supra).
374 The final sentence of N.J.R. 4:42-9(a)(2) reads:
A fiduciary may make payments on account of fees for legal services rendered
out of a fund entrusted to him for administration, subject to approval and
allowance or to disallowance by the court upon settlement of his accounts.
This was also the final sentence in the former N.J.R.R. 4:55-7(b). It was added to the
Rule by amendment, dated July 27, 1961, effective Sept. 11, 1961. 84 N.J.L.J. 418 (1961).
375 In re Koretzky, 8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951) (discussed beginning at note 108
supra and accompanying text).
376 Ferguson v. Rippel, 23 N.J. Super. 132, 142, 92 A.2d 647, 652-53 (App. Div. 1952),
cert. denied, 11 N.J. 329, 94 A.2d 548 (1953) (discussed beginning at note 110 supra and
accompanying text).
377 United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738 (1931), quoted with approval
in Katz v. Farber, 4 N.J. 333, 342, 72 A.2d 862, 867 (1950) (discussed beginning at note
97 supra and accompanying text).
378 State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1953) (discussed at length at
notes 70-90 and 118-26 supra and accompanying text).
379 See Katz v. Farber, 4 N.J. 333, 72 A.2d 862 (1950) (discussed beginning at note
97 supra and accompanying text); Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Caltagirone, 119 N.J.
Eq. 491, 182 A. 862 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) (discussed beginning at note 99 supra and
accompanying text).
380 Grober v. Kahn, 47 N.J. 135, 219 A.2d 601 (1966) (discussed at length beginning
at note 231 supra and accompanying text); Sunset Beach Amusement Park Corp. v.
Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 162 A.2d 834 (1960) (discussed at length beginning at note 190 supra
and accompanying text).
381 Blut v. Katz, 36 N.J. Super. 185, 115 A.2d 119 (App. Div. 1955) (discussed
beginning at note 136 supra and accompanying text); Long v. Mertz, 21 N.J. Super. 401,
91 A.2d 341 (App. Div. 1952) (discussed beginning at note 134 supra and accompanying
text).
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and in-certain cases, both to the proponent and to the contestant out
of the estate of the decedent. It will be observed that the effect of the
former arrangement is to shift the burden of litigation from one party
to another against the supposed basic policy of the rule. The effect of
the latter arrangement is to place this burden upon moneys which are
in effect in the custody of the court and the subject of litigation, thus,
under early language, constituting a "fund in court." But such an
analogy has been ignored in the cases. And lately, an allowance has
been approved for a widow establishing the terms of a trust out of the
estate involved in the litigation, not as out of a "fund in court," but
based both on the doubtful analogy to the case in which a disputed will
38 2
is offered for probate and the supposed authority of R. 4:42-9(a)(3).
In a fourth exception, the Rule, now in R. 4:42(a)(4) and formerly
in R.R. 4:55-7(c), authorizes an allowance in actions for land mortgage
foreclosure but limits the amount to the schedule set forth. And in the
fifth paragraph of the present rule, R. 4:42-9(a)(5), formerly R.R.
4:55-7(f), a similarly limited authorization is permitted in an action for
foreclosure of a tax sale certificate. The former provision has created a
serious problem of reconciliation for the court. A contractual provision
in a bond secured by a land mortgage for an allowance in excess of the
amount allowed by the Rule will not be enforced. 38 3 For the sake of
consistency, such a provision in a note secured by a land mortgage will
be enforced only to the extent it is reasonable, and bearing on the issue
of reasonableness is the availability of prior recourse to the foreclosure
of the mortgage security. If the mortgage is sufficient, recovery on the
note will be confined to the schedule set forth in paragraph (a)(4) of
the present rule. 384 There is no discussion in these cases of why the
moneylender is entitled to an exception, even thus limited, from the
supposed general policy of bearing his own expense. And the rule does
not apply to bondholders or note holders not secured by a land mortgage.
In 1971 a sixth exception was added to the rule in favor of a successful claimant in an action upon a liability or indemnity policy of
insurance, thus overruling prior case law holding against such an allowance.38 5 The new exception again shifts the burden of litigation
382 Risley v. Kirkman, 56 N.J. 464, 267 A.2d 50 (1970) (discussed beginning at note
352 supra and accompanying text).
383 Bank of Commerce v. Markakos, 22 N.J. 428, 126 A.2d 346 (1956) (discussed in
detail beginning at note 141 supra and accompanying text).
384 Bergen Builders, Inc. v. Horizon Developers, Inc., 44 N.J. 435, 210 A.2d 65 (1965)
(discussed beginning at note 219 supra and accompanying text).
385 This overruled, legislatively, the prior holding in Gerhardt v. Continental Ins.
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from one who sues solely in his own behalf. But the allowance was
probably authorized not because of any special equitable considerations
affecting this type of litigation, but again, as in the case of a mortgage
foreclosure, for the sake of apparent consistency. If you allow the assured a counsel fee for the expense of defending prior litigation, it is
obvious that it makes no sense to disallow him the fee for expense in
prosecuting the instant litigation.
Other exceptions are permitted under R. 4:42-9(a)(7), formerly
R.R. 4:55-7(d): "As expressly provided by these rules with respect to
any action .... " As construed, this authorizes a fee to a union following
a dissolution of a prior interlocutory ex parte injunction directed
against the union in a labor dispute, either after a hearing on the
merits or upon plaintiff's application for a dismissal with prejudice.38 6
This is so by virtue of the provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-51
affecting labor disputes as construed by the supreme court, since the
statute was not superseded by the terms of R.R. 4:67-9 (now R. 4:52-7).
However, the statute will not be construed as providing for a fee in a
case involving a matter of union-employer arbitration since this does
not constitute within the terms of the statute, a "labor dispute." Nor
is it applicable in a case actually involving such a dispute where the
interlocutory injunction, though meritoriously granted, must be dissolved on appeal due to the commission by the trial judge of procedural
error. 8 7 Fear of labor unrest was stated as the reason for the statutoryrule exception.
Nor will a similar statute, requiring the posting of security for
costs on behalf of a corporation in a stockholder's derivative action and
authorizing by implication the allowance of counsel fees against the
stockholder should he be unsuccessful, be followed in the absence of a
specific rule incorporating such statute.38 8 But this statute has recently
been revised to make explicit the authorization of such an allowance,
with a recommendation to the supreme court that its rule governing
"Secondary Action by Shareholders," formerly R.R. 4:36-2, now R.
4:32-5, be amended so as not to supersede the recent revision, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6. 389 To date this has not been done. Whether the
Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966) (discussed beginning at note 276 supra and accompanying text).
386 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Local 449, Elec. Workers, 23 N.J. 170, 128 A.2d 457
(1957) (discussed in detail beginning at note 147 supra and accompanying text).
387 United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Steelworkers, Local 2026, 37 N.J. 343, 181
A.2d 353 (1962) (discussed beginning at note 188 supra and accompanying text).
388 DeBow v. Lakewood Hotel & Land Ass'n, 52 N.J. Super. 288, 145 A.2d 493 (App.
Div. 1958) (discussed in detail beginning at note 174 supra and accompanying text).
89 See notes 184-85 supra and accompanying text.
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court will follow DeBow in the face of this explicit statutory provision
and request is debatable.
Further allowances for counsel fees may be made under other
provisions in the rules, incorporated by reference under R. 4:42-9(a)(6),
as in the case of certain transgressions of the rules governing pretrial,
discovery and trial. And, as we have seen, completely apart from the
authorization of R. 4:42-9 and supposedly resting on a different basis
is the directive in R. 4:58 that the court award a "reasonable attorney's
fee" for failure to accept an offer of judgment.
And even beyond any of the rules there is the inherent power in
the trial court to make an allowance for violation of a necessary procedural rule of that court, albeit unwritten, as was done in the case of
a belated application for adjournment 89 0 (now covered by specific rule).
Indeed, there would seem to be similar authority to make such an
award as a penalty for dilatory tactics deliberately employed in the
course of proceedings, at least in an action for escheat. 391 In these circumstances the Rule does not seem to apply.
Nor does the Rule apply-no explanation has been given for this
as well as for the prior exceptions-in an action for malicious prosecution, 892 although apparently, and again inexplicably, the Rule would
apply if one had sought the allowance in the very action maliciously
prosecuted. Nor does the Rule apply to an action in contract or debt
which includes a claim for a reasonable attorney's fee in bringing such
action pursuant to a pre-existent contractual provision therefore. 893
However, such a provision will be enforced only to the extent it is
reasonable, with the special aforementioned problem in the case of a
note secured by a land mortgage. 894
Again, the Rule does not apply in a successful suit of a municipal
official for a judgment for back pay subject to mitigation for income
390 Allegro v. Afton Village Corp., 9 N.J. 156, 87 A.2d 430 (1952) (discussed at
note 161 supra and accompanying text); New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Renner, 32 N.J.
Super. 197, 108 A.2d 107 (App. Div. 1954), aff'd, 18 N.J. 485, 114 A.2d 555 (1955) (discussed
beginning at note 162 supra and accompanying text).
391 State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1953) (discussed at length at
notes 70-90 and 118-26 supra and accompanying text).
392 Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super., 139, 83 A.2d 246 (Ch.1951), aff'd,
9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952) (discussed beginning at note 159 supra and accompanying
text).
393 Cdhen v. Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 44 N.J. 450, 210 A.2d 73 (1965) (discussed
beginning at note 221 supra and accompanying text); Alcoa Edgewater No. 1 Fed. Credit
Union v. Carroll, 44 N.J. 442, 210 A.2d 68 (1965) (discussed beginning at note 217 supra
and accompanying text).
894 Bank of Commerce v. Markakos, 22 N.J. 428, 126 A.2d 346 (1956) (discussed in
detail beginning at note 141 supra and accompanying text).
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earned during the period of suspension or discharge. However, it will
apply-again, without reason-in such a suit where the judgment for
back pay contains no provision for mitigation39 5 (and apparently will
apply to a suit for breach of contract brought by one other than a
municipal official, regardless of the possibility of mitigation of damages).
Finally, the Rule will not apply in a suit for trademark infringement where an accounting for profits accruing from such infringement
would be too complicated, time consuming and expensive. 96
In sum, the Rule will sometimes apply and a fee will be denied
because, the case not falling within the class of one of its stated exceptions, it is prohibited. And sometimes it will not apply and the fee will
be allowed even though the case does not fall within the class of one of
its exceptions. The approach is indeed piecemeal and the effect disorderly. The Rule affords uncertain and unequal protection.
The Reason for the Piecemeal Approach: "A Matter of Practice and
Procedure"
In the beginning, of course, there was a theory which, though
simple in statement, was intended to cover the entire field of all we
have surveyed. It was this: counsel fees are incidental to the remedy,
and as such, are a matter of practice and procedure. Reality has in fact
gradually overtaken the theory. The reality is that counsel fees are a
matter of remedy. In some cases, their allowance is in relief of need,
as in the case of the matrimonial suitor. In others, it is an aid by way
of equalization through the notion of a "fund in court," as in the cases
of a class suitor. In still others it is in redress of the harm resulting from
an impingement upon a litigant's "interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation," as in the case of malicious prosecution or the case of
trademark infringement. In yet other cases it remedies the wrong resulting from litigation unjustifiably conducted or unjustifiably prolonged.
Men at large recognize the recovery of these fees as a remedy and
attempt to obtain their recovery by including in their contracts of
trade a provision therefor in the event of breach and subsequent litigation, and such recognition will be honored by the courts.
While through these cases and its various rules regarding counsel
fees the court has given recognition to the realities involved-that a
395 Perrella v. Board of Educ., 51 N.J. 323, 240 A.2d 417 (1968) (discussed beginning at
note 301 supra and accompanying text).
896 Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., 50 N.J. 563, 236 A.2d 861 (1967)
(discussed in detail beginning at note 286 supra and accompanying text).
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woman in need must be helped, that unjust enrichment must be
avoided, that a litigant has an interest in freedom from the expenses of
litigation and that men have a right to protect themselves against the
expenses of litigation-it has not given formal recognition to the basic
principle involved: the recovery of these fees in some cases is part of the
law of damages, and in all cases is remedial in nature.
Instead, the court has continued to label the allowance not as a
matter of remedy, but one of procedure, and to pretend that it has
incorporated the entire solution of the various facets of the problem in
simple rule form, as though in advance it had committed itself and the
entire judicial system to the prior determination and disposition of the
issue of counsel fees in every case. By actually providing in the Rule
that no counsel fees shall be allowed except as there specified, it was,
whether it wanted to or not, really saying that only in those specific
cases could a counsel fee be justified, as though any one man or group
of men could decide prospectively when, and only when, the demands
of justice require an allowance. From this, all evils would follow-the
failure of theory in practice and the denial of practice in theory.
Even so, the evils could have been reduced in number and severity
had there been a systematic study of the entire subject at the time the
Rule was formulated. There is no indication this was ever done. The
matter was made more difficult by the prohibition against supplemental
legislation. When, early in 1950, the legislature had attempted to undo
the rigidity of the Rule by passage of a bill designed to return to the
chancery division the general power to award counsel fees in equity
cases, the court in Winberry v. Salisbury8 97 declared its rules of procedure not subject to legislative amendment. By amendment to the rule
regarding counsel fees adopted later the same year, the court deleted
the reference in the Rule to allowances permitted "by law," that is, by
legislation, thereby wiping out every past specific statutory allowance
and the hope of any future statutory reform. 398
And in view of the legislative unrest, it became politically necessary in December, 1950, to ratify the earlier decision that an allowance
of counsel fees was a matter of procedure. The court had to construe
the constitution as removing from the equity court the power to fashion
such a remedy and placing this power exclusively in the hands of the
supreme court in the name of procedure, and to hold that the matter
897 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950) (discussed in detail
beginning at note 33 supra and accompanying text).
898 See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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was not substantive. 99 The effect of these decisions was to remove the
trial court as an effective agent for the dispensation of justice in the
first instance, leaving each and every step of progress or reform of the
law of counsel fees a matter for the supreme court itself.
Thus, since the proper remedies to be fashioned in all cases cannot
be prescribed in advance, and since the Rule, under the guise of regulating procedure, had done just that, there has been an outright denial
of the remedy, and hence of justice, in highly meritorious situations
such as the fiduciary accounting cases. There has been an arbitrary
modification of the remedy, as in the land mortgage cases, in order that
the Rule may not seem foolish. There have been grants of the remedy
without adequate bases of distinction, as in the contract cases, by simply
declaring the Rule not applicable, or, as in other cases, by declaring
the fees "traditional" or calling them "expenses."
And with each succeeding case the court seems to have sunk deeper
and deeper into a morass of "explanations" and inconsistencies, seems
more and more to be exercising a prerogative. It encourages appeals,
and by not affording the parties a solid basis for appeal, fosters suitors
rather than advocates. By granting the remedy for "traditional" elements of damages, it confines its development of the law to the established precedents in the federal practice and other states instead of, in
cases involving simple adversaries, examining the question on the
merits-when is litigation justifiable and when not. It produces in the
bar the sense that the court is wrong and stubborn.
In sum-and this is the second principal conclusion we have
reached in our study-"the piecemeal approach," which has brought
forth such highly undesirable consequences, has resulted inevitably
from an initial unhappy decision to consider the allowance of counsel
fees a matter of practice and procedure susceptible to regulation by the
rule-making process instead of a matter of remedy.
The Reason for Persistence: Power
The third chief conclusion of our study is that the court, backed
into a corner by a history of its own making, has persisted in its mistakes in order to preserve its power. Its predicament was indeed formi399 Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950) (discussed
in detail beginning at note 41 supra and accompanying text). But see State v. Mulvaney,
61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972), wherein the court again inexplicably held that the
imposition of part of the "costs" of the state's prosecution against a convicted defendant
was improper. The court held that the authority to impose costs must be found in a
statute. Costs, then, in criminal proceedings are for the legislature. But in civil actions,
they are matters for the court.
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dable. The original Rule did not cohere and the cases that construed it
were muddled. The alternatives open to the court were and are not
pleasant. To allow the trial court, even by rule, to decide in the first
instance upon an allowance would be to repudiate the holding of
Liberty Title and imply that the court had usurped the normal power
of the trial court. To allow the legislature to help would be to weaken
Winberry and its entire premise of absolute judicial competence in the
matter of procedure. To repudiate "traditional" precedents would be
to expose the court to greater discontent. Even to rewrite the Rule so
as to incorporate therein the case law on "fund in court" and the gloss
on mortgage foreclosures would render apparent its piecemeal approach
and its inherent arbitrariness. To abandon the Rule would be the most
painful decision of all: a confession that the rule-making power had
been bungled. To abandon it as misconceived would be the most
damaging of all: a confession that the rule-making power has been
erroneously extended into the field of remedies, and the court should
somehow be subject to review.
The imminent logic of the court's own history would bar any of
these alternatives. Instead, as though intent on perpetuating its mistakes and at the same time affording a satisfactory way out of them, it
retained the Rule in the 1969 revision with all its manifest inconsistencies and non-applicabilities and proposed, in the very same revision,
its own alternative: an allowance of a "reasonable attorney's fee" up to
$750 in the context of an offer of judgment.
And again consistent with its past history, the court is seemingly
unaware or unconcerned that, with the new rule on offer of judgment,
it is effecting a substantial change in the law of counsel fees by recognizing new substantive interests, akin to those previously recognized,
and arranging for their vindication. Additionally, it has created, and
not provided for, new problems in the enforcement of the new rule.
Primarily, there is the issue of "reasonableness" (another potential
"fund in court"); secondly, the relationship of the new rule to the prelitigation agreement (Alcoa), as well as to the class suitor and to the
labor union in a labor dispute-in short, its relationship to the whole
law of counsel fees. The court is apparently willing to start upon another 21-year cycle of silent amendment, of unexplained exceptions
and non-applications, of uncertainty and appeals.
An Excess of Power
From these prior conclusions-that there is no law of counsel fees
in the proper meaning of the term in the state of New Jersey; that this
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basic alegality, entailing a number of highly undesirable consequences,
has followed from the supreme court's initial mistake in considering
the matter a subject of practice and procedure amenable to the rulemaking process; and that the court, cornered by a history of its own
making, has preferred to persist in its error rather than to own up and
rectify it-a fourth conclusion follows: that as a practical matter of
government, the court has too much power for its own good and the
good of the public it is intended to serve.
The placement in one body of government of the power to make
rules and the power to say what they mean involves serious liabilities.
If that body, in our case the supreme court, whether for reasons of lack
of time or lack of resource, does not do the job of rule-making in a
serious, studious and systematic fashion in the first place, it is likely
that the same body, when called upon to construe the rule in the
second place, will tend to expend its greater energies in safeguarding
the dignity of the rule, and thereby of itself as rule-maker, rather than
in advancing the cause of reasonableness, intelligibility and justice. If
necessary, reasons will be withheld for decisions of construction, makeweight arguments employed and patent contradictions in the decisions
left unexplained.
It may be argued that this need not happen. But considering the
nature of the case, it is very likely. Judges are trained in the trial of
particular causes, exposed to the tale of what has already transpired
between the parties and used to the proper disposition of these disputes according to the common law method of analogy and precedent.
They are not trained in or organized for the legislative method: the
systematic survey of an entire area of the law; the conduct of comprehensive hearings with their mixture of fact and interest, expert and
lobbyist proposal, diagnoses and plans, and surveys and polls; the careful estimate of public opinion and of patterns of growth and decline;
the imaginative guess at the future; the formulation of choice for the
proper direction of growth; and the careful consideration of all the
possible contingencies with their ramifications. 400 Most of all, they are
400 See remarks of Chief Justice Weintraub in an address at Rutgers Law School,
Newark, N.J., Sept. 10, 1966, reported in 89 N.J.L.J. 618 (1966):
The question today is not whether the courts may or ought to make law,
but whether the courts have the wherewithal for intelligent law-making. Too
little attention has been paid to the problem of gathering the data needed for an
informed policy decision. The legislative process permits a public hearing for
everyone concerned with an issue, and although, at the State level, the public
hearing is used but sparingly, a citizen may at least write a letter to his legislator. The judicial process runs another way: the record is made by the litigants
alone . ...
The nature of the judicial process is markedly different from that of the legislative.
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not attuned to the rhythms of debate, the give and take of argument
conducted not from the bench, but on the floor or around the table.
Holders of office in tenure, jurists are prone to state the questions and
supply the answers, and look to others for confirmation and supporting
information rather than for initiative and the alternate statement of
question or answers.
While it is true that all legislators do not live by their own appropriate methodology and that some legislatures may sometimes perform
as though they lacked a methodology at all, nevertheless, the likelihood
of developing sound legislation is far greater with men whose business
is provision for the future than with men whose business is the just
determination of the already past.
Yet, it must be granted that with proper precaution this peculiar
disability of the judiciary in rule-making can be avoided by means of a
highly professional staff employed for the task of problem identification, research and investigation, the preparation of reports and proposed rules of regulation, under the chairmanship and direction of an
experienced judge afforded the proper relief from the trial of cases for
the legislative work required.
But even where a highly professional product has been set forth,
as in the case of the federal rules, there have been significant expressions of reservation concerning the wisdom and propriety of the arrangement wherein the court that makes the rule also bears the power
401
to declare their meaning in the particular case.
The point made above is that the nature of the judicial process will have a formative
influence upon those called to use it, namely, the judges, and will tend to render them
predisposed to use the methods peculiar to the judicial process even in areas, such as
rule-making, where such methods are not appropriate.
401 See statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas in opposition to
the submission of rules by the United States Supreme Court to Congress by order of
Jan. 21, 1963, on the ground that many of the proposed rule changes
determine matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants . . . that in
practical effect they are the equivalent of new legislation which . . . the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the Congress and approved
by the President. . . . Our chief objections to the rules relate essentially to
the fact that many of their provisions do "abridge, enlarge or modify" substantive rights ....

374 U.S. at 865-66 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
The Justices recommended instead that in the future the statute be amended to
place the responsibility for prescribing Rules of Civil Procedure upon the Federal Judicial
Conference rather than upon the Court:
Transfer of the function to the Judicial Conference would relieve us of the
embarrassment of having to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of rules
which we have approved and which as applied in given situations might have to
be declared invalid.
Id. at 870.
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This union of the power of rule-making and rule-construction
becomes even more questionable when in a given case it is argued that
a rule of court at issue is ultra vires, as beyond the provisions of the
enabling statute or constitution. 402 For the court which has made the
rule must also decide whether its own act in making the rule falls
within the limits of its own rule-making power.
And when the court, in the exercise of its power to make a rule,
has done so without due survey and consideration of the subject matter
controlled, in an area beyond its competence: when, in short, the rule
is not only ultra vires but badly made, the union of these powers is no
longer a mere liability, but a downright dangerous weapon.
The dangers increase where, as in New Jersey and unlike the
federal system, 40 3 a rule of court is not subject to legislative review
and approval; where the power of rule-making emanates not from a
legislative enactment, but from a supposedly absolute constitutional
grant; and where the court assumes that whatever is within its special
province, as the award of a remedy such as the allowance of a counsel
fee, or the decision of a controversy in the administration of justice, is
necessarily either a matter of practice and procedure or of the proper
administration of the courts, and hence necessarily a matter for regulation by the unreviewable rule-making power. In and of itself, lack of
thoroughness in the exercise of rule-making power merely breeds an
increase in litigation and a bewildered, anxious and pliant inferior
bench and bar in search of a solution of the issues raised in such litigation.
The union of these various powers in the one body of government
without recourse or review, has seriously affected the court. It has led
to the confusion of the basic categories of the law: substance, remedy,
procedure, administration of justice and administration of the courts.
It has impaired the court's ability to reason in the decision of its cases
and caused it to abandon judicial habits of consistency and logic. And
through the court, it is seriously affecting the bench and bar of the
state, and eventually thereby, the people of the state.
With this in mind, it would be well to recall the words of one who
recently worked in our midst regarding the special place in government
to be accorded the doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
402 The Editorial, Due Process and Rulemaking, 92 N.J.L.J. 452 (1969), called attention to the lesser problem: the lack of a procedural mechanism whereby a rule of
court can be challenged as beyond the rule-making power of the supreme court. It did
not advert to the more serious problem: such a challenge would inevitably have to be
decided by the body challenged.
408 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
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Calling to mind the advice of Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison, he wrote:
Nor . . . should we shut our eyes to the fate of the individual
citizen in those countries that have abandoned or give merely lip
service to the doctrine of the separation of powers. On respect for
the doctrine of the separation of powers, not as a technical rule
of law but as a guide to the sound functioning of government, rests
not only the stability of this nation but of every other nation and
the freedom not only of our own citizens but of the citizens of
every other country. The doctrine must be universal in its application if stability and liberty are to be sought and obtained.
These were the concluding words of the late Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey,
in his The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Its Present-Day
Significance,40 4 considered by one commentator to be "the only modem
comprehensive statement and analysis of the constitutional doctrine
....

[I]t should be required reading for all students of government or

40 5

law."
It is indeed ironic that despite his learning, the late Chief Justice
did more than any man, by his opinions in Winberry, Liberty Title,
Otis and Bank of Commerce, to undermine this doctrine as a guiding
principle in the state of New Jersey. For the danger in New Jersey since
1947 has not been the encroachment of the executive power by the
legislative branch of government or of the legislative power by the
executive branch, but of the legislative power by the judicial branch;
and within the judicial branch, the encroachment of the power of the
inferior courts by the supreme court. This we have learned from counsel fees. It would be naive to suppose that such a power, thus expanding, will confine itself to that narrow subject.
An Undue Process
The final conclusion is this: that a process which concentrates in
one unreviewable body the power to make rules regarding practice
and procedure governing the courts and the administration of these
courts, and the power to determine whether the subject-matter covered
by such rules is in reality a matter of practice and procedure or involves the administration of the courts, is not due process.
Further, that this process, as applied, whereby such remedies as
the allowance of "counsel fees" (R. 4:42-9) and of "attorney's fees" (R.

1404

A. T. VANDERBILT, THE DocTRINE OF THm SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-

DAY SIGNmIcca

143-44 (1963).

405 Conant, Introduction, id. at v.
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4:58) are created without the possibility of legislative intervention or
alteration in these areas of substantive and remedial law, is not due.
Further, that this process, as applied, in creating and denying
liability for the allowance of such fees, in the rules and then setting
aside or applying such rules in the cases without standard, is not due
and affords unequal protection.
Further, that this undue process, having as its ultimate source a
provision of the state constitution as construed in Winberry v. Salisbury
and the cases following it, and thus being beyond any state-authorized
redress, can only be redressed in an action brought in the federal
courts. The grounds for such redress are that, by this "action," the
State of New Jersey has deprived and is depriving certain litigants of
the property of an allowance for counsel fees without due process of
law or in violation of the guarantee of equal protection, both as set
forth in the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.

